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ABSTRACT
Physical Layer Security Performance Study for Two-Hop Wireless Networks with
Buer-Aided Relay Selection
by
Xuening Liao
As wireless communication technologies continue to evolve rapidly, an unprecedented
amount of sensitive information, such as nancial data, physical health details and
personal prole data, are transmitted through various wireless networks. Howev-
er, the broadcast nature of wireless medium makes it dicult to shield these sensi-
tive information from unauthorized users (eavesdroppers), and thus securing wireless
communication is becoming an increasingly urgent demand. Physical layer (PHY)
security has been proposed as one promising technology to provide security guar-
antee for wireless communications, owing to its unique advantages over traditional
cryptography-based mechanisms, like an everlasting security guarantee and no need
for costly secret key distribution/management and complex encryption algorithm-
s. This thesis therefore focuses on the PHY security performance study for two-hop
wireless networks with buer-aided relay selection (a typical PHY security technique),
where relay buers will be adopted to help the transmission of the message.
We rst investigate the security-delay trade-o of the buer-aided relay selection
scheme in a two-hop wireless network with multiple randomize-and-forward (RF) re-
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lays where dierent codebooks are used at the source and the relays respectively.
To evaluate the security and delay performances of the system, we derive analytical
expressions for the end-to-end (E2E) secure transmission probability (STP) and the
expected E2E delay under both perfect and partial eavesdropper channel state in-
formation (CSI) cases. These analytical expressions help us to explore the inherent
trade-o between the security and delay performances of the concerned system. In
particular, the results in this thesis indicate that: 1) the maximum E2E STP increas-
es as the constraint on the expected E2E delay becomes less strict, and such trend is
more sensitive to the variation of the number of relays than that of the relay buer
size; 2) on the other hand, the minimum expected E2E delay tends to decrease when
a less strict constraint on E2E STP is imposed, and this trend is more sensitive to
the variation of the relay buer size than that of the number of relays. This work is
very important and can really reect the interplay between the overall security and
delay performances of two-hop wireless networks with RF relays.
We then investigate the PHY security performances of two-hop wireless networks
with multiple decode-and-forward (DF) relays where the same codebook is adopted
at the source and the relays, for which we extend the buer-aided relay selection
with RF relays and propose a new buer-aided relay selection scheme to resist the
combining decoding of the signals by the eavesdropper in two-hop wireless networks
with DF relays. To validate the eciency of the new scheme, a theoretical framework
is developed to analyze the E2E delivery process of a packet. Based the theoretical
framework, we derive the closed form of the security and delay performances in terms
of the E2E STP and the expected E2E delay. Then, extensive numerical results are
conducted to validate the eciency of the new buer-aided relay selection scheme,
and to explore the security-delay trade-o issue of the achievable E2E STP (expected
E2E delay) region under a given expected E2E delay (E2E STP) constraint. Finally,
comparisons are made between the new buer-aided relay selection scheme and the
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conventional Max-Ratio scheme, and results show that our new scheme outperforms
the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay selection scheme in terms of the E2E STP. This
work can provide theoretical models for the E2E security and delay performances of
two-hop wireless networks with DF relays, and can be employed as guidelines for the
design of future networks.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
In this chapter, we rst introduce the background of physical layer security and
then present the objective and main works of this thesis. Finally, we give the outline
and main notations of this thesis.
1.1 Physical Layer Security
As wireless communication technologies continue to evolve rapidly, an unprece-
dented amount of sensitive information, such as nancial data, physical health details
and personal prole, will be transmitted through various wireless networks in the near
future [1]. However, the broadcast nature of wireless medium makes it dicult to
shield these sensitive information from unauthorized users (eavesdroppers), and thus
security of wireless communication is becoming an increasingly urgent demand [2].
Traditionally, security issue is addressed by cryptographic methods which utilize
secret keys and encryption/decryption algorithms to ensure the security of the trans-
mitted information above the physical layer [3], [4]. A key premise of these methods
is that eavesdroppers have limited computational capability such that the encryption
algorithms are computationally infeasible for them to decrypt without the secret keys
[4]. Unfortunately, this premise has been challenged as eavesdroppers are becoming
increasingly computationally powerful [5]. Recently, the technology of physical layer
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(PHY) security, which secures information at the physical layer by exploiting the
inherent randomness of wireless channels and noise, has attracted considerable atten-
tions [6]. Compared to cryptographic methods, PHY security technology can enjoy
the following major advantages. First, PHY security technology eliminates the costly
secret key distribution/management and encryption/decryption algorithms in cryp-
tographic methods, making it more suitable for resource-limited wireless networks
[7]. Second, dierent from cryptographic methods, PHY security technology assumes
no limitations for eavesdroppers in terms of the computational capability, making
it completely immune to the rapid advances in computing power of eavesdroppers
[7]. Third, unlike the computational security achieved by cryptographic methods,
PHY security approaches can achieve the information-theoretic security [8], which
is regarded as an everlasting security guarantee and can be quantied precisely by
multiple criteria like secrecy rate [9], [10], secrecy throughput [11], [12], and secrecy
outage probability [13], [14]. Therefore, PHY security technology has been recognized
as a highly promising approach to provide a strong form of security guarantee for the
next-generation wireless communication networks [15].
The rst work regarding the PHY security is conducted by Wyner [16], who
introduced the wiretap channel in his paper. In the wiretap model, three nodes
are included: a transmitter, a receiver and an eavesdropper. The transmitter wishes
to transmit secure information to the legitimate receiver over a noisy main channel,
and the eavesdropper attempts to intercept the information transmitted over the
main channel though another noisy channel, which is called the wiretap channel or
eavesdropper channel. It has been revealed by Wyner in his paper that, when the
main channel is better than the eavesdropper channel, a non-zero secrecy rate can
be achieved. This result is of great importance as it proves that information can be
secured without a secret key, which will greatly save the cost of key distribution and
management in secure communications. Wyner's work was then generalized by Csizar
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and Korner in [17], their results showed that a non-zero secrecy rate is also achievable
even when the main channel is not better than the eavesdropper channel, and they
proved that this can be achieved by exploiting the technique of channel prex to inject
additional randomness into both the main and the eavesdropper channels to create
a better main channel over the eavesdropper channel. Following these two works,
extensive research eorts have been devoted to studies on the PHY security techniques
by exploiting the randomness of wireless channels and noise. These techniques mainly
includes articial noise injection/cooperative jamming [18{20], beam-forming [21{23],
coding [24{26] and relay selection with or without the consideration of relay buers
[27{40], etc.
Articial noise injection/cooperative jamming ensures the security of wireless net-
works by adopting the non-transmitting nodes to act as jammers to transmit jamming
signals to the eavesdropper, such that the signals received at the eavesdropper can
be degraded. According to the types of jamming signals, cooperative jamming can
be classied into two categories. One is cooperative jamming with Gaussian noise
jamming signal which will cause interference to both the legitimate receivers and
the eavesdropper [18]. Another is cooperative jamming with jamming signal of the
same codebook and the jamming signal is predened with a certain structure and
thus can be eliminated at the intended receiver [20]. For the rst category of co-
operative jamming, the jamming process can be conducted without the requirement
of the eavesdropper's channel state information (CSI), while the legitimate channel-
s may be aected by the jamming signals. For the second category of cooperative
jamming, a better security performance can be obviously achieved. However, due to
the requirement of a certain structure of the jamming signals, the construction of
the codebook is very complex and it usually requires the jammer to be located closer
to the eavesdropper than to the intended receiver, which is not always possible in
practice, especially for eavesdroppers who only wiretap the legitimate channel and
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transmit no information all over the time.
Beam-forming is usually exploited in the multiple-in-multiple-out (MIMO) net-
work, where all nodes are equipped with antennas and one data stream can be trans-
mitted to the intended receiver over multiple antennas. It enhances the security of
information transmitted in the network by controlling the direction and strength of
signal such that the signal is radiated towards the direction of the intended receiv-
er, while receivers in other directions can hardly receive the signal [22]. It has been
proved in [21] that beam-forming can maximize the secrecy capacity of wireless net-
works by optimizing the beam-forming weights at the source and relay nodes. How-
ever, this technique requires high coordinations (such as synchronization and central
optimization) among the source and relay nodes, which usually needs high overhead
in implementation, as a large amount of information will be exchanged between the
nodes. Moreover, to obtain better eciency, the design of cooperative jamming also
requires the CSI of the eavesdropper channels.
Coding aims to improve the security of wireless networks based on the idea of
stochastic encoding [24]. For each legitimate information, the coding technique en-
codes the legitimate message together with multiple protection messages which carry
no information. First, it will randomly choose a protection message and then asso-
ciates the legitimate information and the protection message together into a single
codeword. If the legitimate channel is better than the eavesdropper channel, the pro-
tection message is designed detrimental enough to interfere with the eavesdropper,
but can remains ensure the resolvability of the condential message at the intended
receiver. This technique can notably achieve high security performance of the net-
work, but the constructing of the codebook is hard and even challenging. Similar to
the majority of the above two PHY secuirty techniques, coding also requires the CSI
knowledge of the eavesdropper channel.
The relay selection technique aims to improve the security of wireless networks
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by choosing a relay (called message relay) with a strong legitimate link but a weak
eavesdropper link. According to whether the relay buers are introduced or not,
relay selection can be divided into two categories, i.e., relay selection without buer-
s (traditional relay selection) [27{29] and relay selection with buers (buer-aided
relay selection) [30{40]. For traditional relay selection, its transmission manner is
prexed, i.e., the source-relay-destination transmission manner. If a relay is selected,
the transmission of the information can be nished in two consecutive time slots. In
the rst time slot, the source transmits the information to the message relay and the
message relay will directly transmit the information to the destination in the next
time slot even if the current transmission link is not secure enough for transmission.
However, for the buer-aided relay selection, if a relay is selected for transmission, it
can store the information in its buer to wait for a better transmission link. Thus,
each information now may go through three processes, i.e., the source-relay trans-
mission process, queuing process in a relay buer and the relay-destination transmis-
sion process, and in each time slot, there are three possible transmission states, i.e.,
source-relay transmission, relay-destination transmission and no transmission. Com-
pared with the traditional relay selection, authors in [33] showed that buer-aided
relay can achieve a full diversity gain which is two times the number of relays in
the network. Dierent from other PHY security techniques above, the relay selection
technique is easy to be accomplished and it has no extra bad eect on the signals at
the legitimate nodes, while the design of relay selection may also requires the CSI of
the eavesdropper channel.
1.2 Objective and Main Works
This thesis adopts the buer-aided relay selection with Gaussian noise to ensure
the security of wireless communications, considering its possibility of being imple-
mented in practice with dierent network scenarios. Our objective is to fully explore
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the PHY security performances of buer-aided relay selection for two-hop wireless net-
works. Towards this end, we rst study the PHY security performances of buer-aided
relay selection scheme for two-hop wireless networks with randomize-and-forward (R-
F) relays where eavesdropper can only decode the packet in two hops independently.
We then investigate the PHY security performances of buer-aided relay selection
scheme for two-hop wireless networks with decode-and-forward (DF) relays where
the same codebook is adopted at the source and the relay nodes, and the eavesdrop-
per can thus decode the packet by combing the signals received in two hops. Two
commonly-used PHY security performance metrics are of particular interest, which
are the end-to-end (E2E) secure transmission probability (STP) and E2E delay [39].
E2E STP characterizes the probability of successfully transmitting a packet from the
source to the destination and E2E delay denes the time slots it takes a packet to
reach its destination after it is generated at the source node. The main works and
contributions of this thesis are summarized in the following subsections.
1.2.1 PHY Security Performance Study of Buer-Aided Relay Selection
Scheme for Two-Hop Wireless Networks with RF Relays
This work focuses on the security-delay trade-o study of the buer-aided re-
lay selection scheme for two-hop wireless networks with RF relays. While existing
works [30{37] regarding the security performance study of two-hop wireless network-
s with buer-aided relay selection mainly derived security performance of a single
link (Please refer to Section 2.1 for related works), the E2E security performance
of such networks remains largely unexplored. Moreover, the delay issue has not
been addressed yet. In this work, as a rst step towards the study of E2E security
and delay performances for two-hop wireless networks with buer-aided relay selec-
tion, we study the E2E STP and E2E delay of a two-hop wireless network with one
source-destination pair, multiple RF relays and an eavesdropper intercepting both
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the source-relay and relay-destination links. We consider the Max-Ratio buer-aided
relay selection scheme to select the message relay for receiving packets from the source
or forwarding packets to the destination node. The main contributions of this work
can be summarized as follows:
 Analytical expressions for E2E secure transmission probability (STP) and ex-
pected E2E delay: we consider a two-hop relay system, which consists of a
source-destination pair, one eavesdropper and multiple relays each having a -
nite buer, and study the E2E security and delay performances of the system
under both perfect and partial eavesdropper CSI cases. To derive the E2E per-
formances, we develop a theoretical framework consisting of two Markov chains,
here the rst one characterizes the buer states for a packet in its source-relay
delivery process while the second one characterizes the buer states for the
packet in its relay-destination delivery process. With the help of the frame-
work, the analytical expressions for the E2E STP and the expected E2E delay
are derived to evaluate the security and delay performances of the system.
 Study on the security-delay trade-o: based on the analytical expressions on
the E2E STP and expected E2E delay, we provide extensive numerical results
to illustrate our theoretical ndings. These results indicate that there is a clear
trade-o between the E2E security performance and delay performance in the
concerned system. For example, if we impose a larger upper bound (i.e., a less
strict constraint) on the expected E2E delay, the maximum E2E STP (in terms
of either relay buer size or number of relays) tends to increase, and such trend
is more sensitive to the variation of the number of relays than that of the relay
buer size. On the other hand, if we impose a smaller lower bound (i.e., a more
strict constraint) on the E2E STP, the minimum expected E2E delay (in terms
of either relay buer size or number of relays) tends to decrease, and this trend
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is more sensitive to the variation of the relay buer size than that of the number
of relays.
With this work, we can further explore the overall interplay between the PHY se-
curity security and the delay performances for two-hop wireless networks with buer-
aided relay selection, which is of great importance for the design of future networks.
1.2.2 PHY Security Performance Study of Buer-Aided Relay Selection
Scheme for Two-Hop Wireless Networks with DF Relays
The available buer-aided relay selection schemes consider mainly the networks
with RF relays (Please refer to Section 2.1 for related works), which may signicantly
limit their applications to wireless networks with DF relays where the eavesdropper
can decode the information by combining the signals received in two hops. This work
considers a new two-hop wireless network with a source-destination pair, multiple DF
relays each having a nite buer and an eavesdropper who can combine the signals
in two hops to conduct its decoding. A new buer-aided relay selection scheme is
proposed to resist the eavesdropper and we attempt to explore the eects of such
eavesdropper's decoding strategy on the concerned network in terms of the E2E STP
and expected E2E delay. The contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
 Propose new buer-aided relay selection scheme to resist the eavesdropper's
combining decoding. This is achieved to select the message relay by considering
not only the link quality of the main and the eavesdropper channels and the
relay buer states, but also the eavesdropper's decoding strategy.
 Derive analytical expressions for E2E STP and expected E2E delay for both cas-
es when either the instantaneous CSI, or only the distribution of eavesdropping
channels are available: A theoretical framework which consists of two Markov
chains are developed to derive the E2E performances. The rst Markov chain
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characterizes the buer states for a packet in its source-relay delivery process,
and the second Markov chain characterizes the buer states for the packet in
its relay-destination delivery process. With the help of the framework, the E2E
STP and the expected E2E delay are derived to evaluate the security and delay
performance of the proposed buer-aided relay selection scheme.
 Conduct extensive numerical results to validate the eciency of the proposed
buer-aided relay selection schemes in terms of the E2E STP and the expected
E2E delay. Based on the theoretical results, the security-delay trade-o issue is
then studied to explore the achievable E2E STP (expected E2E delay) region
under a given expected E2E delay (E2E STP) constraint. Finally, comparisons
are made between the new buer-aided relay selection scheme and the con-
ventional Max-Ratio scheme in terms of the E2E STP and expected E2E delay,
results show that our new scheme outperforms the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay
selection scheme in terms of the E2E STP.
By conducting this work, we can provide theoretical models for the E2E security
and delay performances of two-hop wireless networks with DF relays, which can be
employed as guidelines for network designers.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter II introduces the
related works of this thesis. In Chapter III, we introduce our work regarding PHY
security performance study of buer-aided relay selection scheme for two-hop wireless
networks with RF relays, and Chapter IV presents the work on PHY security per-
formance study of buer-aided relay selection scheme for two-hop wireless networks
with DF relays. Finally, we conclude this thesis in Chapter V.
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1.4 Notations
The main notations of this thesis are summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Main notations
Symbol Denition
S source node
D destination node
E eavesdropper
N number of relays
Rn the n-th relay
R selected message relay
Qn queue of relay Rn
	(Qn) number of packets in the relay Rn's queue
jhi;jj2 channel gain of link from node i to j
C i;js instantaneous secrecy of link i to j
" target secrecy rate
E[] expectation operator
f() probability-density-function (PDF)
F () cumulative-density-function (CDF)
P[] probability operator
P common transmit power of source and relay nodes
 noise variance
Rt transmission rate of the main channel
Rs secrecy rate
se average channel gains of the source-eavesdropper link
re average channel gains of the relay-eavesdropper link
 average channel gain ratio of the rst hop
10
 average channel gain ratio of the second hop
pst end-to-end (E2E) secure transmission probability (STP)
T E2E delay
Ts service time at the source node
Tr service time at the relay node
Tq queuing delay at the relay node
 E2E delay delay constraint
 E2E STP constraint
S+i sets of states si can move to for a successful source-relay trans-
mission
S i sets of states si can move to for a successful relay-destination
transmission
N1 number of available relays for the source-relay transmission
N2 number of available relays for the relay-destination transmission
si relay buer state
si the set of states that have the same stationary probability as si
(si;sj) the set of states that state si has to pass through to reach a
state in sj
A Markov chain for the source-relay delivery processeA Markov chain for the relay-destination delivery process
ai;j entry of the Markov chain for source-relay delivery processeai;j entry of the Markov chain for relay-destination delivery process
si stationary probability of state si in the source-relay delivery
process
esi stationary probability of state si in the relay-destination delivery
process
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CHAPTER II
Related Works
This section introduces the existing works related to our study in this thesis,
including the works on the E2E performance study of buer-aided relay selection
for two-hop wireless networks with RF relays and the works on the PHY security
performance study of buer-aided relay selection for two-hop wireless networks with
DF relays.
2.1 PHY Security Performance Study of Buer-Aided Relay
Selection Scheme for Two-Hop Wireless Networks with
RF Relays
By now, many works have been devoted to the study on the PHY security per-
formances of wireless networks with buer-aided relay selection [30{37]. These works
mainly focused on two-hop relay systems with one source-destination pair and sin-
gle/multiple relays. For the scenario with single relay, the buer-aided relay selection
problem reduces to the selection of a link among the links of source-relay, relay-
destination and source-destination to meet a given security criteria [30{32]. For the
relay system with a half-duplex (HD) relay where no direct source-destination link is
available, the authors in [30] proposed two link selection policies with the considera-
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tions of both transmission eciency and secrecy constraints. They also considered the
secrecy throughput maximization problem under secrecy outage probability (SOP)
constraint and the SOP minimization problem under secrecy throughput constraint.
This work was then extended to the scenario with a full-duplex (FD) relay in [31],
where the authors proposed a hybrid HD/FD relaying scheme that allows the relay
to switch between the FD mode and HD mode. The optimal setting of mode switch-
ing probability was also examined in [31] for the maximization of secrecy network
throughput. For the relay system with direct source-destination link, the authors in
[32] proposed a link selection scheme based on articial noise injection, where the
node not involved in the transmission serves as a jammer for noise injection. The
secrecy throughput maximization issue was also explored in [32] under certain SOP
constraint.
Regarding the two-hop relay systems with multiple relays, the authors in [33] con-
sidered the case when there is only one eavesdropper and proposed relay selection
schemes under both the perfect and partial eavesdropper CSI assumptions, where
a link is selected based on the channel gain ratio between the main channel and
the eavesdropping channel. The SOP of the selected link was derived to evaluate
the security performance of the proposed schemes. This work was then extended
in [34], where the relay selection is based on the instantaneous secrecy capacity of
the individual links. For a MIMO relay system with one eavesdropper and unknown
eavesdroppers CSI, the authors in [35] and [36] proposed a link selection scheme based
on the maximum legitimate channel gain and derived the corresponding SOP perfor-
mance of the selected link. The authors in [37] also considered a MIMO system in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Under the assumption of perfect eavesdroppers'
CSI, they combined the relay selection scheme in [33] with the cooperative jamming
technique and proposed a greedy algorithm to identify the best link and jammer to
maximize the instantaneous single-link secrecy rate. It is notable from above that
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existing works on the PHY security study of buer-aided relay systems with multiple
relays mainly focused on analyzing the single link rather than the E2E PHY security
performances [33{37].
These works demonstrated that buer-aided relay selection is exible and promis-
ing for achieving a desirable PHY security performance. It is notable, however, that
a signicant delay may be introduced in buer-aided relay systems due to its buer
queuing process and relay selection process. First, in the relay selection process, a
packet at the source or the head of a certain relay queue may have to wait for a long
time (i.e., service time) before it is served by the selected link; Second, the buer
queuing process, i.e., the process when a packet moves from the end of the relay
queue of a certain relay to the head of this queue, may also incur a long queuing
delay at the relay since a relay usually needs to help forward multiple packets. While
there are some works on the delay performance study of buer-aided relay selection,
the important security issue has not been considered therein [41{43]. Thus, some
natural and crucial questions arise: how will the security and delay performances of
buer-aided relay systems interplay with each other, and what would be the achiev-
able region of one performance metric if some constraints are imposed to the other?
Answering these questions is very important for the applications of buer-aided relay
systems, especially when they are applied to support delay-sensitive applications in
wireless communication scenarios [44].
2.2 PHY Security Performance Study of Buer-Aided Relay
Selection Scheme for Two-Hop Wireless Networks with
DF Relays
Since the pioneer work of Huang [30], the PHY security performances of buer-
aided relay selection for two-hop wireless networks have been extensively studied
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[30{40], and most of them mainly focus on the networks with RF relays where d-
ierent codebooks are used at the source and the relay nodes respectively, and the
eavesdropper can only conduct its decoding in each hop independently. Jing et al.
[30] consider a two-hop network with one source, one destination, one DF relay with
innite buer and an eavesdropper only wiretapping the relay-destination link. They
proposed a link selection scheme based on the quality of the source-relay and relay-
destination links, and studied the security performances of a single link in terms of
the secrecy outage probability (SOP). Shae et al. consider a wireless network with
one source, one destination, one eavesdropper and one DF-full-duplex (FD) relay [31],
[32]. They proposed a link selection scheme based on the instantaneous secrecy rate
of all links and the target secrecy rate and also derived expression of the E2E secre-
cy throughput. Chen et al., however, consider a two-hop wireless network with one
source-destination pair, an eavesdropper and multiple RF relays [33]. They proposed
a Max-Ratio relay selection scheme based on the relay buer states and channel gains
of the main and eavesdropper channels and also explored the secrecy outage proba-
bility performance of a single link for their proposed scheme. For the same network
scenario as in [33], Zhang et al. proposed a new Max-Ratio relay selection scheme
by taking a consistent parameter into consideration and the SOP was also studied to
validate the eciency of their scheme [34]. Xuan et al. focus on a MIMO network
with one source-destination pair, multiple RF relays each with a nite buer and an
eavesdropper intercepting both the source-relay and relay-destination links [35], [36].
A joint relay and transmit antenna selection scheme was proposed based on the relay
buer state and the instantaneous rate of the main channels and the SOP of a single
link was derived in a closed form. Lu et al. consider a MIMO system with one source,
multiple destinations, multiple intermediate relays and multiple eavesdroppers [37].
They provided an algorism to select the best relay based on the instantaneous secrecy
rate. Results showed that their proposed scheme can achieve a higher secrecy rate
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compared with the Max-Ratio relay selection scheme. Our previous work studies a
two-hop wireless network with multiple RF relays, and the E2E security and delay
performances were derived in a closed form for only perfect eavesdropper CSI case
[38]. As an extension of the work in [38], we developed a general theoretical frame-
work for the E2E performance analysis of Max-Ratio relay selection scheme in our
previous work [39] and the E2E performances in terms of the E2E delay and secure
transmission probability (STP) were also derived in a closed form for both perfect
and partial eavesdropper CSI cases.
It is noticeable, however, that a more dangerous scenario exists where DF relays
are included in the concerned network, i.e., the same codebook is adopted at the
source and relay nodes [45], [46], and the eavesdropper can thus combine the signals
received in two hops to conduct its decoding. In such scenario, the eavesdropper
can achieve a higher decoding probability of the transmitted packet and the security
performance of the concerned network will decrease. This makes the existing buer-
aided relay selection schemes unsuitable. However, the study of buer-aided relay
selection scheme and its E2E security and delay performances for this more dangerous
network scenario remains unknown.
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CHAPTER III
Physical Layer Security Performance Study of
Buer-Aided Relay Selection Scheme for Two-Hop
Wireless Networks with RF Relays
This chapter focuses the security-delay trade-o of the buer-aided relay selection
scheme in a two-hop wireless system, which consists of a source-destination pair,
one eavesdropper and multiple relays each having a nite buer. To evaluate the
security and delay performances of the system, we derive analytical expressions for
the E2E STP and the expected E2E delay under both perfect and partial eavesdropper
channel state information (CSI) cases. These analytical expressions help us to explore
the inherent trade-o between the security and delay performances of the concerned
system. In particular, the results in this chapter indicate that: 1) the maximum E2E
STP increases as the constraint on the expected E2E delay becomes less strict, and
such trend is more sensitive to the variation of the number of relays than that of the
relay buer size; 2) on the other hand, the minimum expected E2E delay tends to
decrease when a less strict constraint on E2E STP is imposed, and this trend is more
sensitive to the variation of the relay buer size than that of the number of relays.
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3.1 Outline
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces
the system model, transmission scheme, the buer-aided relay selection schemes and
performance metrics. Section 3.3 provides the general framework for characterizing
the E2E packet delivery process. The E2E STP and delay performances are analyzed
in Section 3.4, and the numerical results are provided in Section 3.5. Finally, Section
3.6 summarizes this chapter.
3.2 System Model and Denitions
3.2.1 System Model
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, we consider a two-hop wireless system consisting of
one source S, one destination D, N relays R1; R2; :::; RN adopting the RF decoding
strategy, and one eavesdropper E wiretapping on both the source-relay and relay-
destination links. Same as [47], [48], the RF strategy concerned in this work adopts
dierent codebooks at the source and relay respectively, so the eavesdropper can only
independently decode the signals received in the two hops. We assume all nodes have
one antenna and operate in the HD mode such that they cannot transmit and receive
data simultaneously. The source and relays are assumed to transmit with common
power P . Each relay Rn (1  n  N) is equipped with a data buer Qn that can
store at most L packets. Here the buer size is dened by the number of packets and
each packet is with the same bits M . We use 	(Qn) to denote the number of packets
stored in the buer Qn and all packets in the buer are served in a First-In-First-Out
(FIFO) discipline. The source S is assumed to have an innite backlog, i.e., always
has packets to transmit.
We consider a time-slotted system where the time is divided into successive s-
lots with equal duration. All wireless links are assumed to suer from the quasi-
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the system model.
static Rayleigh block fading such that the channel gains remain constant during
one time slot, but change independently and randomly from one time slot to the
next. We use jhijj2 to denote the channel gain of the link from node i to node j,
where i 2 fS;R1; R2; :::; RNg and j 2 fR1; R2; :::; RN ; E;Dg. We assume all source-
relay, relay-destination and relay-eavesdropper channel gains are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) with mean E [jhSRnj2] = sr, E [jhRnDj2] = rd and
E [jhRnEj2] = re, respectively. Here, E [] stands for the expectation operator. The
mean of the source-eavesdropper channel gain is denoted as E [jhSEj2] = se. In this
work, we assume the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of legitimate
channels (i.e., jhSRn j2 and jhRnDj2) are always known. Regarding the knowledge of
eavesdropper CSI, we consider two cases, i.e., perfect CSI case where the instanta-
neous eavesdropper CSI (i.e., jhSEj2 and jhRnEj2) are known and partial CSI case
where only the average eavesdropper CSI (i.e., se and re) are available. In addition
to fading, all links are also impaired by the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
with variance 2.
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3.2.2 Transmission and Buer-Aided Relay Selection Schemes
In this work, we assume that no direct link is available between the source S and
the destination D, so a relay will be selected to help the S ! D transmission. This
work adopts the buer-aided relay selection scheme that fully exploits the diversity
of relays and buers. More specically, we adopt the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay
selection scheme in [33]. Although this scheme is called relay selection, its principle is
to select the securest link from all individual source-relay and relay-destination links
for transmission in each time slot. Thus, the relay selection is solely determined by
the instantaneous secrecy rate of individual links.
Since we focus on the selection of the securest link from all available individual
links, we adopt the secrecy capacity formulas of an individual link to conduct the
relay selection in this work. Before introducing the relay selection scheme, we rst
introduce the selection criterion. Considering an individual link A! B, where A 2 S
and B 2 fR1;    ; Rng or A 2 fR1;    ; Rng and B 2 D. The instantaneous secrecy
capacity of link A! B is given by [49]
CABs = maxfCABm   CAEe ; 0g; (3.1)
where
CABm = log

1 +
P jhABj2
2

; (3.2)
and
CAEe = log

1 +
P jhAEj2
2

; (3.3)
denote the capacities of main channel A ! B and eavesdropper channel A ! E,
respectively. To transmit a message to B, the transmitter A chooses a rate pair (RABt ,
RABs ) based on the Wyner's coding scheme [16], where R
AB
t denotes the total message
rate and RABs denotes the intended secrecy rate. The rate dierence R
AB
t   RABs
22
reects the cost of protecting the message from being intercepted by the eavesdropper
E, which means E cannot decode the message if CAEe < R
AB
t  RABs . We use RABs
as the selection criterion in the relay selection scheme.
The value of RABs is determined as follows. For a given time slot, if link A! B is
selected for transmission, A uses the knowledge of the main channel CSI to adaptively
adjust RABt arbitrarily close to the instantaneous capacity of the main channel C
AB
m
(i.e., RABt = C
AB
m ), such that no decoding outage occurs at B. For the setting of
RABs , as the instantaneous eavesdropper CSI is available in the perfect eavesdropper
CSI case, we set RABs = C
AB
m   CAEe at A to maximize the intended secrecy rate.
However, only the average eavesdropper CSI is known in the partial eavesdropper
CSI case, so A chooses the secrecy rate RABs = C
AB
m   log
 
1 + PAE
2

[50]. Notice
that although the conventional approach is to choose a xed RABs in this case [30{
32], the rationale behind our time-varying RABs is that it can yield a higher secrecy
throughput than the xed one, as can be seen from the results in [50]. Although our
RABs is varying in each time slot, it can be determined based on the main channel
CSI abstracted from the pilot signal of B [50{52]. In this work, we consider the high
SNR regime, so CABm and R
AB
s in the perfect eavesdropper CSI case are approximated
by CABs = R
AB
s  log

jhAB j2
jhAE j2

[50], and the RABs in the partial eavesdropper CSI is
approximated as RABs  log

jhAB j2
AE

where log is to the base of 2. To inform the
transmitter A when to transmit, we place a threshold " on the secrecy rate RABs , such
that A can send messages to B if and only if RABs > ".
Remark: Here we show the dierences of several similar terms mentioned above:
the secrecy capacity, the secrecy rate and the target secrecy rate. The secrecy rate
represents the intended transmission rate of a link to securely transmit a message to
the receiver, the secrecy capacity denotes the upper bound of the secrecy rate, and
the target secrecy rate represents the security requirement of the concerned network,
which is a given parameter of the network and is a threshold of the secrecy rate.
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We are now ready to introduce the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay selection scheme.
In both eavesdropper CSI cases, the relay with the link that has the maximal intended
secrecy rate will be selected. For the perfect eavesdropper CSI case, the best relay
RPF is selected as
RPF = argmax
Rn
max
 jhSRnj2  1	(Qn)6=L
jhSEj2 ;
jhRnDj2  1	(Qn)6=0
jhRnEj2

; (3.4)
where 1	(Qn)6=L(1	(Qn)6=0) equals 1 if 	(Qn) 6= L (	(Qn) 6= 0), i.e., relay Rn is
available for source-relay (relay-destination) transmission and equals 0 otherwise. For
the partial eavesdropper CSI case, the best relay RPT is selected as
RPT = argmax
Rn
max
 jhSRn j2  1	(Qn) 6=L
se
;
jhRnDj2  1	(Qn) 6=0
re

: (3.5)
In equations (3.4) and (3.5), the max operation is used to nd the maximum of
the channel gain ratios (i.e., the ratio of the main channel gain to the eavesdropper
channel gain) of the available source-relay and relay-destination links for a particular
relay Rn. Thus, the argmax operation, which is operated over all relays, returns the
relay with the link that can yield the maximum channel gain ratio.
From (3.4) and (3.5), we can see that we select the message relay from all available
relays in perfect case according to the instantaneous channel gain ratios of main and
eavesdropper channels, and in the partial case according to the ratios of the instanta-
neous channel gains of main channels and the average channel gains of eavesdropper
channels. With the RF strategy applied at the relays, if the relay Rn is selected
for transmission, the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the buer-aided relay system
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when L = 0 is formulated as [48]
Cs =
1
2

min log2

1 + P jhSRn j2
1 + P jhSEj2 ;
1 + P jhRnDj2
1 + P jhRnEj2
+
: (3.6)
However, for the general buer-aided relay system when L > 0, its secrecy capacity
formulation in terms of dierent SNRs/SINRs is still an open issue. Notice that with
the buer-aided relay selection scheme concerned in this work, the relay selection in
each time slot is only based on the instantaneous secrecy capacity of each link and
states of all relay buers. Thus, the secrecy capacity formulation of an individual
link (3.1) is enough for us to derive the main results in this work (see Section IV-A
and Section IV-B for details). It is also worth noting that the buer-aided relaying
scheme in this work is dierent from the traditional relaying. In the traditional
relaying, a packet is transmitted to the relay, where it is decoded and forwarded to
the destination in the following time slot. In the relaying scheme of this work, a packet
is rst transmitted from the source to a selected relay, where it will be decoded and
stored, and will not be forwarded to the destination until the relay is selected again
for the relay-destination transmission.
3.2.3 Performance Metrics
This chapter aims to investigate the trade-o between the PHY security and
delay performances of the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay selection scheme. To model
the delay performance of the packet delivery process, we adopt the widely-used end-
to-end (E2E) delay, which is dened as the time slots it takes a packet to reach
its destination after it is generated at the source node. Consider the delivery process
of a tagged packet from S to D via a relay R, the E2E delay can be calculated as
the sum of the service time (i.e., the waiting time of the packet at both S and the
head of R's queue before it is transmitted) and the queuing delay (i.e., the time it
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takes the packet to move from the end to the head of R's queue). Dening Tq as the
queuing delay and Ts (Tr) as the service time at the source node (the head of R's
queue queue), the E2E delay T can be formulated as
T = Ts + Tr + Tq: (3.7)
It is notable that available studies on the PHY security performance study of
buer-aided relay selection schemes mainly focus on the secrecy outage probability of
a single link, which is dened as the probability that the secrecy outage (i.e., the event
that the instantaneous secrecy capacity Cs is below the target secret rate ") occurs on
this link [31], [33], [34]. However, such single link-oriented metric may fail to provide
an intuitive insight into the PHY security performance of the whole packet delivery
process. According to the denition of the notion of secure connection probability
in [53], we dene a similar a metric called E2E secure transmission probability
(STP) to model the security performance. Focusing again on the delivery process
of the tagged packet from S to D via R, the E2E STP is dened as the probability
that neither the S ! R nor R ! D delivery suers from secrecy outage. Based
on the formulation of the secure connection probability in [53], we formulate the E2E
STP as
pst = P(CSRs  "; CRDs  "); (3.8)
where CSRs (C
RD
s ) denotes the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the S ! R (R !
D) link, and CSRs  " (CRDs  ") represents the event that the S ! R (R ! D)
link is selected and secure transmission is conducted when the tagged packet is at S
(the head of R's queue) and " is the target secrecy rate.
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Figure 3.2: End-to-end delivery process of a packet.
3.3 General Framework for E2E Packet Delivery Process Mod-
eling
In this section, we introduce our general framework for characterizing the E2E
packet delivery process under both perfect and partial eavesdropper CSI cases, in-
cluding the source-relay delivery process, buer queuing process and relay-destination
delivery process, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. To facilitate the introduction of the
framework, we focus again on the delivery process of a tagged packet from S to D
via a relay R.
For the modeling of source-relay (resp. relay-destination) delivery process, we
rst develop a Markov chain to model the transition of possible buer states when
the tagged packet is at S (resp. the head of R's queue). Based on the absorbing
Markov chain theory, we then determine the corresponding stationary probability
distribution, such that the probability of each possible buer state can be obtained.
For the modeling of buer queuing process, we regard the queues of all relays as
a single queue and the resultant Markov chain is equivalent to a Bernoulli process.
Notice that the buer queuing process is relatively simple in our framework, and thus
we focus on the modeling of the source-relay and relay-destination delivery processes
of the tagged packet in this section.
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PF(s) =
N1(s)X
n1=0

N1(s)
n1

( 1)n1 
2"n1 + 

2"
 + 2"
N2(s)
; (3.9)
PF(s) =
N1(s)X
n1=0

N1(s)
n1

( 1)n1 (3.10)
"
n1  2F1

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
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
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2"n1 + )
N2(s)
 
2F1

N2(s); N2(s) + 1;N2(s) + 2; 1  n1

N2(s) + 1


n1
N2(s) #
;
PT(s) =

1  e 2"=N1(s) 1  e 2"=N2(s) ; (3.11)
PT(s) =
N2(s)X
n2=0
N1(s) 1X
n1=0

N2(s)
n2

N1(s)  1
n1

( 1)n2+n1N1(s)e
  (n2++n1)2"

n2 +  + n1
:(3.12)
3.3.1 Source-Relay Delivery Process Modeling
This subsection derives the stationary probability distribution for the source-relay
delivery under both perfect and partial eavesdropper CSI cases. We rst dene the
possible buer states for the source-relay delivery. As the network contains N relays
and each relay has a buer of size L, there are (L + 1)N possible states in total.
Dening si the i-th
 
i 2 f1; 2;    ; (L+ 1)Ng state, we can represent si by
si = [	si(Q1);    ;	si(Qn);    ;	si(QN)]T ; n 2 f1; 2;    ; Ng; (3.13)
where 	si(Qn) 2 [0; L] gives the number of packets in buer Qn at state si. We can see
that each buer state si can determine a pair (N1(si); N2(si)), where N1(si) 2 [0; N ]
and N2(si) 2 [0; N ] denote the number of available (i.e., 	si(Qn) 6= L) source-relay
links and available (i.e., 	si(Qn) 6= 0) relay-destination links at state si, respectively.
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Next, we determine the state transition matrix. Suppose that the buers are in
state si at time slot t. According to the relay selection scheme in Section 3.2.2, one
link will be selected from the available source-relay and relay-destination links for
transmission at this time slot. Thus, the buer state may move from si to several
possible states at the next time slot, forming a Markov chain. We dene A the
(L + 1)N  (L + 1)N state transition matrix, where the (i; j)-th entry ai;j = P(sjjsi)
denotes the transition probability that the buer state moves from si to sj. According
to the transmission scheme in Section 3.2.2, the state transition happens if and only
if a successful transmission is conducted on the selected link (i.e., Rs  "). We
use S+i (S i ) to denote the set of states si can move to when a successful source-relay
(relay-destination) transmission is conducted. Now, we are ready to give the following
lemma regarding the state transition matrix A.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the buers are in state si at time slot t, the (i; j)-th entry
of the state transition matrix A under both the perfect and partial eavesdropper CSI
cases is given by
ai;j =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(si); if sj = si;
(si)
N1(si)
; if sj 2 S+i ;
1  (si)  (si)
N2(si)
; if sj 2 S i ;
0; elsewhere:
(3.14)
where  2 fPF = perfect;PT = partialg denotes the eavesdropper CSI case, and
(si) and (si) are given in (3.9) and (3.10) for the perfect CSI case and in (3.11)
and (3.12) for the partial CSI case with the parameter s = si.
Proof 1 See Appendix A.1 for the proof.
From Lemma 1, we can see that ai;j 6= 0 and
(L+1)NP
j=1
ai;j = 1, which means that
the Markov chain can move to any state sj
 
j 2 f1; 2;    ; (L+ 1)Ng from a starting
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state si with a non-zero probability, i.e., the Markov chain is irreducible [54]. We can
also see from Lemma 1 that ai;i 6= 0, which means that the Markov chain can return to
state si in one time slot, i.e., the period of si equals 1. This proves that every state si is
aperiodic and thus the Markov chain is aperiodic [54]. According to Denition 1 and
Theorem 2 of Chapter 11 in [55], the irreducibility and aperiodicity properties ensure
that our Markov chain that models the buer states of the source-relay transmission
process is stationary and there exists a unique stationary probability distribution
 = [s1 ;    ; si ;    ; s(L+1)N ]T such that A =  and
(L+1)NP
i=1
si = 1, where 

si
denotes the stationary probability of state si.
According to Lemma 2 in [54], the analytical expression of si can be given by
si =
0B@(L+1)NX
j=1
Q
si02(si;sj )
ai;i0Q
sj02(sj ;si )
aj;j0
1CA
 1
; (3.15)
where si (sj) denotes the set of states that have the same stationary probability
as si (sj) has, and (si;sj) ((sj;si) ) denotes the set of states that state si (sj)
has to pass through to reach a state in sj (si).
3.3.2 Relay-Destination Delivery Process Modeling
This subsection derives the stationary probability distribution of all possible buer
states provided that the tagged packet is at the head of R's queue. Since the buer
of R cannot be empty, there are L  (L + 1)N 1 states in total. Similarly, we dene
the k-th
 
k 2 f1;    ; L(L+ 1)N 1g state as
esk = [	esk(Q1);    ;	esk(Q);    ;	esk(Qn);    ;	esk(QN)]T ; n 2 f1;    ; Ng; n 6= ;
(3.16)
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where 	esk(Qn) and 	esk(Q) represent the number of packets in the buers of Rn and
R at state esk respectively. It's obvious that 0  	esk(Qn)  L and 1  	esk(Q)  L,
and every state esk corresponds to one pair (N1(esk); N2(esk)), where N1(esk) and N2(esk)
denote the numbers of available source-relay and relay-destination links at state esk,
respectively.
We denote eA as the L(L+1)N 1L(L+1)N 1 state transition matrix of all states
esk, where the (k; l)-th entry eak;l = P(esljesk) is the transition probability that the state
moves from esk to esl. Similarly, we use eS+k ( eS k ) to denote the set of states esk can
move to when a successful source-relay (relay-destination) transmission is conducted.
Notice that the buer state can move from esk into eS k only when a successful relay-
destination transmission except for R ! D occurs. Based on the above denitions,
we give the following lemma regarding the state transition matrix eA.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the buers are in state esk when the tagged packet is at the
head of relay R's queue, the (k; l)-th entry of the state transition matrix eA under
both the perfect and partial eavesdropper CSI cases is given by
eak;l =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(esk); if esl = esk;
(esk)
N1(esk) ; if esl 2 eS+k ;
1  (esk)  (esk)
N2(esk)  1 ; if esl 2 eS k ;
0; elsewhere:
(3.17)
where  2 fPF = perfect;PT = partialg denotes the eavesdropper CSI case, (esk)
and (esk) are given in (3.9) and (3.10) for the perfect CSI case and in (3.11) and
(3.12) for the partial CSI case.
Proof 2 The proof is same as that for Lemma 1, so we have omitted it here.
Similarly, according to [55], we can see from Lemma 2 that our Markov chain
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(s) =
N1(s)X
n1=0
N2(s)X
n2=0

N1(s)
n1

N2(s)
n2

( 1)n1+n2 
2"(n1 + n2) + 
; (3.19)
!(s) =
N1(s)X
n1=0
N2(s) 1X
n2=0
 
N1(s)
n1
 
N2(s) 1
n2

( 1)n1+n2N2(s)2
2"(n1 +  + n2)2 + (n1 +  + n2)
: (3.20)
that models the buer states of the relay-destination transmission process is also
stationary. We use e = [ees1 ;    ; eesk ;    ; eesL(L+1)N 1 ]T to denote the corresponding
stationary probability distribution when the tagged packet is at the head of R's
queue, where eesk denotes the stationary probability of state esk. Based on the state
transition matrix eA and Lemma 2 in [54], we can determine the analytical expression
of the stationary probability of state esk in e as
eesk =
0B@(L+1)NX
l=1
Q
esk02(esk;esl )eak;k0Q
esl02(esl;esk )eal;l0
1CA
 1
; (3.18)
where esk (esl) denotes the set of states that have the same stationary probability
as esk (esl) has, and (esk;esl) ((esl;esk) ) denotes the set of states that state esk (esl)
has to pass through to reach a state in esl (esk).
3.4 E2E STP and Delay Analysis
With the help of the stationary probability distributions in Section 3.3, this section
provides theoretical analysis for the E2E STP and delay performances under both the
perfect and partial eavesdropper CSI cases.
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3.4.1 E2E STP Analysis
We derive the E2E STP in this subsection and summarize the main results in the
following theorem.
Theorem III.1 Consider the two-hop relay wireless system as illustrated in Figure
3.1. Under the transmission scheme and the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay selection
scheme in Section 3.2.2, the E2E STP for the perfect eavesdropper CSI case can be
determined as
pPFst =
(L+1)NX
i=1
PFsi PF(si)
L(L+1)N 1X
k=1
PFesk 1  PF(esk)  PF(esk)N2(esk) ; (3.21)
where si (esk) denotes the buer state when the tagged packet is at S (the head of a
given relay queue), PFsi and 
PFesk are given by (3.15) and (3.18) with  = PF, PF(esk)
is given by (3.9) with s = esk, PF(si) and PF(esk) are given by (3.10) with s = si and
s = esk respectively. The E2E STP for the partial eavesdropper CSI case is given by
pPTst =
(L+1)NX
i=1
PTsi  (1  (si)  !(si))
L(L+1)N 1X
k=1
PTesk !(esk)N2(esk) ; (3.22)
where PTsi and 
PTesk are given by (3.15) and (3.18) with  = PT, (si) is given by
(3.19) with s = si, !(si) and !(esk) are given by (3.20) with s = si and s = esk
respectively.
Proof 3 According to the formulation of E2E STP in (3.8), we have
pst = P
 
CSRs  "; CRDs  "

: (3.23)
Applying the law of total probability yields
pst =
(L+1)NX
i=1
si  P
 
CSRs  "; CRDs  "jsi

: (3.24)
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We dene R = Rn; n 2 N1 the event that relay Rn is selected for the source-relay
delivery at buer state si, where N1 = fnj	si(Qn) 6= Lg denotes the index set of
available relays. Obviously, jN1j = N1(si). Again, applying the law of total probability,
we have
pst =
(L+1)NX
i=1
si 
X
n2N1
P
 
CSRs  "; CRDs  ";R = Rnjsi

:
(3.25)
After changing the above probability into conditional probability, we have
pst =
(L+1)NX
i=1
si 
X
k2N1
P
 
CSRs  ";R = Rnjsi

P  CRDs  "jCSRns  ";R = Rn; si (3.26)
=
(L+1)NX
i=1
si 
X
n2N1
P
 
CSRns  "jsi

P
 
CRnDs  "

;
(3.27)
where (3.27) follows since the relay-destination delivery is independent of the buer
state and transmission in the rst hop provided R = Rn. Notice that P
 
CSRns  "jsi

is the probability the link S ! Rn is selected and the transmission is secure at state
si when the tagged packet is at S, and P
 
CRnDs  "

represents the probability that
the link Rn ! D is selected and the transmission is secure when the tagged packet is
at the head of Rn's queue.
For the perfect eavesdropper CSI case, it is easy to see CSRs = R
SR
s and P
 
CSRns  "jsi

is equivalent to the transition probability ai;j from si to sj for sj 2 S+i . Thus, we have
P
 
CSRns  "jsi

=
PF(si)
N1(si)
; (3.28)
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according to Lemma 1. Next, applying the law of total probability, we have
P
 
CRnDs  "

=
L(L+1)N 1X
k=1
PFesk  P  CRnDs  "jesk : (3.29)
Since CRnDs = R
RnD
s , we have
P
 
CRnDs  "jesk = P  RRnDs  "jesk (3.30)
=
1  PF(esk)  PF(esk)
N2(esk) ; (3.31)
where (3.31) follows from the proof of Lemma 2. Finally, the E2E STP for the
perfect eavesdropper CSI case follows after substituting (3.31) into (3.29), and then
substituting (3.29) and (3.28) into (3.27).
For the partial eavesdropper CSI case, based on the random variables X
0
and Y
0
in Appendix A.1, P
 
CSRns  "jsi

is equivalent to
1
N1(si)
P

maxfX 0 ; Y 0g
U
 2"; X 0 > Y 0

(3.32)
=
1
N1(si)

1  E[FX0(2"U)FY 0(2"U)]  EU
 Z 1
2"U
P(X 0 < y)fY 0 (y)dy

; (3.33)
where fU(u) = e
 u, ua;b =
jha;bj2
ab
, a; b 2 fSRn; SE;RnD;RnEg and the rst expecta-
tion in (3.33) is equivalent to
P

maxfX 0 ; Y 0g
U
< 2"

; (3.34)
which can be given by the (si) in (3.19) with s = si, and the second expectation in
(3.33) is equivalent to
P

maxfX 0 ; Y 0g
U
 2"; X 0 < Y 0

; (3.35)
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which can be given by the !(si) in (3.20) with s = si. Thus, we have
P
 
CSRns  "jsi

=
1  (si)  !(si)
N1(si)
; (3.36)
and
P
 
CRnDs  "jsi

=
P

maxfX0 ;Y 0g
U
 2"; X 0 < Y 0

N2(si)
=
!(si)
N2(si)
: (3.37)
Following the same idea, we have
P
 
CRnDs  "jesk = !(esk)N2(esk) ; (3.38)
and thus
P
 
CRnDs  "

=
L(L+1)N 1X
k=1
PTesk !(esk)N2(esk) : (3.39)
Finally, substituting (3.36) and (3.39) into (3.27) yields the E2E STP for the partial
eavesdropper CSI case.
3.4.2 E2E Delay Analysis
This subsection presents the analytical results for the E2E delay of the system
under both the perfect and partial eavesdropper CSI cases. We rst derive the mean
service time of the tagged packet at the source and at the head of some relay R's
queue, and then derive the expected queuing delay of the tagged packet at relay
R. Combining the mean service time and the expected queuing delay, we nally
determine the expected E2E delay. We rst establish the following lemma regarding
the mean service time.
36
Lemma 3 The mean service time when the tagged packet is at the source node S is
Ts =
1
(L+1)NP
i=1
si(si)
; (3.40)
where si is given by (3.15) and (si) is given in Lemma 1, and the mean service
time when the tagged packet is at the head of R's queue is
Tr =
1
L(L+1)N 1P
k=1
esk (1 (esk) (esk))N2(esk)
; (3.41)
where esk is given by (3.18), (esk) and (esk)) are given in Lemma 2.
Proof 4 According to the transmission scheme in Section 3.2.2 and the state transi-
tion matrix in Section 3.3, we can see the average service rate (i.e., average number of
packets served per time slot) of a node is equivalent to the probability that a successful
transmission is conducted per time slot by this node. Thus, the average service rate
at S is
(L+1)NX
i=1
si(si); (3.42)
and the average service rate at relay R is
L(L+1)N 1X
k=1
esk (1  (esk)  (esk))N2(esk) : (3.43)
Finally, we obtain the mean service time by calculating the reciprocal of the average
service rate.
Next, we give the following lemma to show the expected queuing delay of the
tagged packet at relay R's queue.
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Lemma 4 The expected queuing delay of the tagged packet at relay R's queue is
Tq =
(L+1)NP
i=1
NP
n=1
si	si(Qn)
N
(L+1)NP
i=1
si(si)
; (3.44)
where si is given by (3.15), (si) is given in Lemma 1.
Proof 5 Based on the general framework in Section 3.3, we model the queues of all
relays as a single Bernoulli queue. According to Little's Law [56], the expected queuing
delay for this queue is
T;totalq =
E

NP
n=1
	(Qn)

rarr
; (3.45)
where the numerator and the denominator denote the expected queuing length and
average arrival rate of relay, respectively. Considering all available buer states, we
can derive the expected queuing length as
E
"
NX
k=1
	(Qn)
#
=
(L+1)NX
i=1
NX
n=1
si	si(Qn): (3.46)
Notice the arrival rate is equivalent to the service rate of S. Based on Lemma 3, we
have
(L+1)NX
i=1
si(si): (3.47)
Thus, the total average queuing delay of all relays is
T;totalq =
(L+1)NP
i=1
NP
n=1
si	si(Qn)
(L+1)NP
i=1
si(si)
: (3.48)
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Due to the symmetry of all relays, the expected queuing delay of each relay is
Tq =
T;totalq
N
; (3.49)
which completes the proof.
Based on Lemma 3 and 4, we are now ready to give the following theorem regarding
the expected E2E delay of the system.
Theorem III.2 Consider the two-hop relay wireless system as illustrated in Figure
3.1. Under the transmission scheme and the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay selection
scheme in Section 3.2.2, the E2E delay of the system for both eavesdropper CSI cases
can be determined as
T =
1 + 1
N
(L+1)NP
i=1
NP
n=1
si	si(Qn)
(L+1)NP
i=1
si(si)
+
1
L(L+1)N 1P
k=1
esk (1 (esk) (esk))N2(esk)
; (3.50)
where  2 fPF;PTg, si is given by (3.15), (si) is given in Lemma 1, esk is given
by (3.18), (esk) and (esk)) are given in Lemma 2.
Proof 6 The E2E delay T directly follows after combining the mean service time in
Lemma 3 and the expected queuing delay in Lemma 4.
3.5 Simulation results
In this section, we rst conduct extensive simulations to validate our theoreti-
cal analysis in terms of the E2E STP and the expected E2E delay. Based on the
theoretical results, we then explore how the network parameters aect these two per-
formances. Finally, we study the achievable E2E STP (delay) region under a certain
39
E2E delay (STP) constraint to illustrate the trade-o between the PHY security and
delay performances.
3.5.1 Simulation Settings
To validate our theoretical results for the E2E STP and expected E2E delay, a
dedicated C++ simulator was developed to simulate the E2E packet delivery process
based on the Max-Ratio buer aided relay selection schemes in (3.4) and (3.5), which
is now available at [57]. With the help of the simulator, we conduct extensive sim-
ulations to calculate the simulated results of E2E STP and expected E2E delay. In
all simulations, the total number of time slots is xed as 105 and the corresponding
relay selection scheme is performed once per slot for each eavesdropper CSI case.
The simulated E2E STP is calculated as the ratio of the number of packets securely
transmitted to the destination D to the total number of packets generated at the
source S, i.e.,
pst =
number of packets securely transmitted to D
number of packets generated
:
The expected E2E delay is calculated as the ratio of the total E2E delay (measured
in time slots) of all packets transmitted to D to the number of these packets, i.e.,
T =
total E2E delay of packets transmitted to D
number of packets transmitted to D
:
Please notice that the metric T accounts for all packets in both eavesdropper CSI
cases, but the meaning of \all packets" diers. In the partial CSI case, \all packets"
refers to not only the securely transmitted packets but also the non-securely trans-
mitted ones. In the perfect CSI case, \all packets" refers to the securely transmitted
packets, because all packets can be securely transmitted.
Similar to the settings in [54], we set the noise variance as 2 = 1, the trans-
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mission power as P = 20, and the average channel gains of the source-relay and
relay-destination links as sr = rd = 5dB. Thus, the corresponding average SNR
high enough to guarantee successful decoding at the relays and the destination. We
set the channel gain ratio  and  as  =  = 2 and the average eavesdropping chan-
nel gains as se =
sr

and re =
rd

. Notice that simulations with other parameters
can also be conducted with our simulator.
3.5.2 Model Validation
We rst conduct simulations for various settings of the target secrecy rate " under
the network scenario of N = 5 and L = 5. The corresponding simulated and theoret-
ical results of the E2E STP pst ( = fPF;PTg) are summarized in Figure 3.3a, and
the results of expected E2E delay T are summarized in Figure 3.1, for both perfect
and partial eavesdropper CSI cases. We then x the buer size as L = 2 and target
secrecy rate as " = 1, and conduct simulations by varying the number of relays N .
We provide plots in Figure 3.4a for the simulated and theoretical results of pst and
in Figure 3.4b for the results of T, under both eavesdropper CSI cases. Finally, we
consider a xed number of relays N = 2 and a given target secrecy rate " = 1. For
this scenario, simulations under various settings of buer size L are conducted, and
the simulated/theoretical results of pst and T are shown in Figure 3.5a and Figure
3.5b, respectively.
We can see from Figure 3.3a, Figure 3.4a and Figure 3.5a, the simulation results
of pst match nicely with the theoretical ones for both eavesdropper CSI cases under
various network settings. This indicates that our theoretical analysis can be used to
eciently model the E2E STP of the system. For T, it can be seen from Figure
3.3b, Figure 3.4b and Figure 3.5b that all simulation results match prociently with
the corresponding theoretical curves, implying that our theoretical analysis is highly
ecient for the E2E delay modeling of the system.
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Figure 3.3: E2E STP and expected E2E delay vs. target secrecy rate ".
3.5.3 Performance Discussion
With the help of theoretical modeling for the E2E STP pst and expected E2E
delay T, we now explore how the network parameters (e.g., N , L and ") aect the
delay and security performances of the system under both eavesdropping CSI cases.
We rst examine how the pst and T vary with the target secrecy rate " for a given
N and L. It can be observed from Figure 3.3a that the pst decreases as " increases in
both eavesdropper CSI cases. This is very intuitive since a larger " represents a higher
secrecy rate requirement, which is less likely to be satised for a secure transmission.
Dierent from the behavior of pst, we can see from Figure 3.3b that the T increases
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as " increases in both cases. According to the transmission schemes in Section 3.2.2, a
larger " results in a reduced successful transmission probability in each hop and thus
a reduced service rate, as can be seen from Lemma 3. The reduction in service rate
leads to not only an increased service time but also an increased queuing delay since
a packet in the relay queue has to wait for a longer time before the service process of
all the packets ahead of it is nished. Another observation from both gures indicates
that the relay selection scheme in the perfect eavesdropper CSI case has consistently
better STP and delay performances than that in the partial CSI case. Based on the
relay selection criteria in (3.4) and (3.5), a link with a larger instantaneous secrecy
rate (or secrecy capacity) can be selected in the perfect eavesdropper CSI, which thus
yields a larger successful transmission probability (or secure transmission probability)
in each hop for a given target secrecy rate ". Thus, the relay selection scheme in the
perfect eavesdropper CSI outperforms that in the partial case in terms of the E2E
STP and E2E expected delay.
Next we investigate the impact of number of relays N on the pst and T for given
" and L. Figure 3.4 illustrates how pst and T vary with N for the setting of L = 2,
 =  = 2 and " = 1. We can see from Figure 3.4a that the E2E STP increases
as the number of relays N increases for both eavesdropper CSI cases. Notice that
the aect of distributing more relays in the system on the E2E STP performance
is two-edged. First, it leads to a link with a larger instantaneous secrecy capacity
selected by the relay selection schemes, so the STP in the rst hop increases. Second,
however, the number of available relay-destination links competing for transmission
increases, which may result in a decreased STP in the second hop. Actually, the
increasing behavior the STP in the rst hop dominates the whole behavior of the
E2E STP, and thus the E2E STP increases as N increases. Similar to the E2E
STP, it can be observed from Figure 3.4b that the expected E2E delay increases as
the number of relays N increases simultaneously. This is also due to the two-edged
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Figure 3.4: E2E STP and expected E2E delay vs. number of relays N .
impact of distributing more relays, which reduces the mean service time in the rst
hop, while increasing the average queuing delay and mean service time in the second
hop. However, the latter impact is dominant, resulting in the increasing behavior of
T vs. N .
Finally, we examine how the pst and T vary with the buer size L for a xed
setting of " and N , as illustrated in Figure 3.5. As can be seen from Figure 3.5 that,
both the E2E STP and expected E2E delay increase as the buer size L increases
under both eavesdropper CSI cases, which is due to the similar reason of distributing
more relays. Another observation from Figure 3.5a indicates that as the buer size
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Figure 3.5: E2E STP and expected E2E delay vs. bu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increases above a certain value, for example, L = 5 in Figure 3.5a, the E2E STP
stays almost constant. This is because that almost all the source-relay and relay-
destination links of all relays are available for relay selection, so the instantaneous
secrecy capacity of the selected link can hardly be improved.
3.5.4 Security-Delay Trade-O Analysis
Based on the theoretical results of pst and T, we now investigate the trade-os
between the E2E STP and expected E2E delay of the concerned system with the
Max-Ratio buer aided relay selection schemes.
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Figure 3.6: Maximum achievable E2E STP vs. E2E delay constraint  .
First, we study the achievable E2E STP region under a given constraint on the
expected E2E delay in both eavesdropper CSI cases. For the scenario of  =  = 2 and
" = 1, Figure 3.6a (resp. Figure 3.6b) illustrates the maximum E2E STP pst achieved
by the optimal number of relays N (resp. buer size L) under various expected E2E
delay constraints  for a xed setting of L = 2 (resp. N = 2). It can be seen from
Figure 3.6a and Figure 3.6b that, as  increases, the maximum achievable E2E STP
increases in both cases, which implies that relaxing the delay constraint can achieve
a larger STP region accordingly. This clearly shows the trade-o between the PHY
security and delay performances of the system. Another observation from Figure
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3.6a (resp. Figure 3.6b) shows that the maximum achievable E2E STP is a piecewise
function of  and an optimal N (resp. L) can apply to a small range of  .
A further careful observation from Figure 3.6 indicates that, as  scales up, the
maximum achievable E2E STP with respect to L in Figure 3.6b becomes less sensitive
to the variation of  (i.e., as  scales up an optimal L can apply to a wider range of
), while this is not the case for the maximum achievable E2E STP with respect to N
in Figure 3.6a. For example, under the perfect eavesdropper CSI case, as  increases
from 18 to 20, the maximum STP in Figure 3.6b remains unchanged while that in
Figure 3.6a increases from 0:9917 to 0:9934. Under the partial eavesdropper CSI case,
a similar observation can be found as  increases from 16 to 18. Thus, compared to
the maximum STP achieved by optimal L, the maximum STP achieved by optimal
N depends more heavily on the variation of the delay constraint  .
Next, we explore the achievable expected E2E delay region under a given E2E STP
constraint under both eavesdropper CSI cases. For the same scenario of  =  = 2
and " = 1, we show in Figure 3.7a (resp. Figure 3.7b) the minimum expected E2E
delay achieved by the optimal number of relays N (resp. buer size L) under various
E2E STP constraints  for a xed setting of L = 2 (resp. N = 2). We can see from
Figure 3.7a and Figure 3.7b that, as  increases, the minimum achievable expected
E2E delay increases in both cases. This suggests that imposing a more stringent
security constraint on the E2E packet delivery leads to a smaller delay region, which
also illustrates a clear trade-o between the PHY security and delay performances.
It can also be observed from Figure 3.7a and Figure 3.7b that all the curves are
truncated at a certain point of  (say threshold), i.e., the minimum expected E2E
delay becomes indeterminable, as  increases above this threshold. For example, this
threshold is about 1 (0.99) for the perfect (partial) CSI case in Figure 3.7a and about
0.7 (0.558) for the perfect (partial) CSI case in Figure 3.7b. This is because that,
under the xed setting of  =  = 2 and " = 1, the E2E STP of each case nally
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Figure 3.7: Minimum achievable expected E2E delay vs. E2E STP constraint .
converges to the corresponding threshold as N (resp. L ) scales up for L = 2 (resp.
N = 2), as can seen from Figure 3.4a (resp. Figure 3.5a). Thus, we cannot nd
an optimal N or L to satisfy the STP constraints larger than this threshold, so the
minimum delay value cannot be determined.
A careful observation from Figure 3.7 indicates that the minimum achievable
expected E2E delay in terms of N becomes less sensitive to the variation of , while
this is not the case for the minimum achievable expected E2E delay in terms of L.
For example, under the perfect eavesdropper CSI case, as  increases from 0:5 to
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0:6, the minimum E2E delay in Figure 3.7a remains unchanged while that in Figure
3.7b increases from 4:45 to 5:43. Under the partial eavesdropper CSI case, a similar
observation can be found as  increases from 0:5 to 0:57. Thus, compared to the
minimum expected E2E delay achieved by optimal N , the minimum expected E2E
delay achieved by optimal L depends more heavily on the variation of STP constraint
.
3.6 Summary
This chapter provided analytical study on the end-to-end (E2E) secure transmis-
sion probability (STP) and expected E2E delay in a two-hop wireless system with
the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay selection, and explored the corresponding trade-os
between the physical layer (PHY) security and delay performances. The results un-
der both perfect and partial eavesdropper CSI cases indicate that we can achieve
a relatively higher E2E STP if a larger E2E delay can be tolerated. In contrast,
we can guarantee a smaller E2E delay at the cost of a lower E2E secrecy rate. In
particular, we can exible control the security-delay trade-o in such system by ad-
justing the number of relays and the relay buer size. These ndings are useful for
the design of buer-aided relay systems in presence of eavesdroppers. Notice that this
work considers the RF strategy such that the eavesdropper can only independently
decode the signals received in the two hops , so one future research direction is to
conduct the performance evaluation of a DF-based buer-aided relay system where
the eavesdropper can combine the signals received in the two hops to achieve a better
decoding performance. Since the secrecy capacity formulation of general buer-aided
relay systems remains an open issue by now, it serves as another interesting future
research topic.
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CHAPTER IV
Physical Layer Security Performance Study of
Buer-Aided Relay Selection Scheme for Two-Hop
Wireless Networks with DF Relays
This chapter focuses on the PHY security performance study of buer-aided relay
selection scheme for two-hop wireless networks with DF relays, for which we investi-
gate the E2E STP and expected E2E delay performances of a two-hop relay wireless
networks with an eavesdropper who conducts its decoding by combining the signals
received in two hops. We consider two cases of the eavesdropper's CSI, i.e., case 1
when the instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper channels are available, and case 2
when only the distributions of the eavesdropper channels are available. A new buer-
aided relay selection scheme is rst proposed for both case 1 and case 2 respectively
and the E2E STP and expected E2E delay are then derived in a closed form by
adopting the Markov chain theory and Queuing theory. Finally, numerical results
are conducted to validate the eciency of our proposed scheme, the security-delay
trade-o issue is addressed and the eects of eavesdropper's decoding strategy on the
performances of the concerned network is also studied.
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4.1 System Model and Assumptions
We consider a two-hop wireless system as illustrated in Figure 4.1, which consists
of one source S, one destination D, N relays Rn (n = 1; 2;    ; N) adopting the
Decode-and-Forward (DF) decoding strategy and an eavesdropper E wiretapping
both the source-relay and the relay-destination links. As in [58{60], the DF strategy
adopts the same codebook at both the source and relay nodes, thus the eavesdropper
in this work can combine the signals received in the two hops to decode the packets.
All nodes in the system are assumed to have one antenna and operate in the half-
duplex mode such that they cannot transmit and receive signals simultaneously. Each
relay Rn is aided by a nite buer Qn of size L to store the decoded packets (each
packet is with the same bits M) received from S before they are forwarded to the
destination D, and the eavesdropper is equipped with an innite buer to store the
signals received in the rst hop. It is obvious that (0  Qn  L). We use 	(Qn) to
denote the number of packets stored in the buer Qn and all packets in the buer
are served in a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) discipline. Thus, if a S ! Rn transmission
succeeds, the corresponding 	(Qn) will be increased by 1. On the contrary, if a
Rn ! D transmission succeeds, the corresponding 	(Qn) will be decreased by 1.
Specially, if 	(Qn) = L or 	(Qn) = 0, the corresponding S ! Rn link or Rn ! D
link is denoted as an unavailable link. The source S is assumed to be backlogged and
it has the same transmit power P as the relay nodes.
We consider no direct link between S and D due to the path loss or deep shad-
owing [61], [62] and communication can be conducted only via a relay Rn. Time
in the system is partitioned into equal slots, and all channels are assumed to suer
from quasi-static Rayleigh fading, i.e., the channel gains remain constant during one
time slot, but change independently and randomly from one slot to the next. The
channel gains of the links S ! Rn, S ! E, Rn ! D and Rn ! E are denoted as
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jhSRn j2, jhSEj2, jhRnDj2 and jhSEj2 respectively, and E(jhSRn j2) = sr, E(jhSEj2) = se,
E(jhRnDj2) = rd and E(jhRnEj2) = re. Here E() stands for the expectation operator.
We assume all source-relay, relay-destination and relay-eavesdropper links are inde-
pendently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Furthermore, all noises are assumed to
be additive white Gaussian Noise (AWGN) with zero mean and unit variance 2 = 1
as in [63].
In this work, we assume that the instantaneous CSI of legitimate channels (i.e.,
jhSRn j2 and jhRnDj2) are always available. Regarding the CSI of eavesdropper chan-
nels, we consider two cases, i.e., the perfect eavesdropper case (Case 1) when the
instantaneous eavesdropper CSIs (i.e., jhSEj2 and jhSEj2) are available, and the case
2 when only the distributions of the eavesdropper channels are available. If a relay
Rn is selected for transmission, the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the S ! Rn
link or Rn ! D link for perfect CSI case can be given as [64]
CSRns = CSRn   CSE = log2

1 + P jhSRn j2
1 + P jhSEj2

; (4.1)
and
CRnDs = CRnD   CRnE = log2

1 + P jhRnDj2
1 + P jhRnEj2

; (4.2)
respectively, where Cij is the instantaneous capacity of the link i to j.
We assume that the instantaneous CSI of the main channels are always available
at the destination D, and the instantaneous CSI (distributions) of the eavesdrop-
per channels are available at D for case 1 (case 2). Neither S nor Rn knows the
instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper channels, and we consider no feedback from
the receiver. Before each time slot, S transmits a pilot signal to each Rn and each
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Figure 4.1: Network model.
Rn will transmit a pilot signal to D, thus Rn can get the information jhSRn j2 and
retransmit it to D, and D can thus get the information jhSRnj2 and jhRnDj2. Then
a relay R will be selected as a receiver or a transmitter by the destination D, to
receive the packet from S or forward the packet to D according to the relay selection
scheme, which will be shown in the following section. Since the instantaneous CSI
of the eavesdropper channels are unavailable at S and Rn and there's no feedback
from Rn (D) to S (Rn), we consider in this work a xed secrecy rate " and a xed
transmission rate r0. As in [36], the packet cannot be decoded when a transmission
outage occurs, i.e., C < r0 and will be eavesdropped by the eavesdropper when the
secrecy outage occurs, i.e., Cs < ". Notice that we assume a high SNR (which can
be seen in many available works [33]) in this work, the transmission outage will never
occurs during the transmission, i.e., the receiver can always decode the packet.
4.2 New Buer-Aided Relay Selection Scheme
Most previous buer-aided selection schemes are limited by the constraint that
the eavesdropper can only independently decode the received information as dierent
codebooks are adopted at the source and the relay nodes respectively. In this section,
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we will propose new buer-aided relay selection schemes for two-hop networks with
DF relays and an eavesdropper who exploits the combining decoding strategy.
4.2.1 New Buer-Aided Relay Selection Scheme
Dierent from most previous buer-aided relay selection schemes where the mes-
sage relay is selected based on the link quality and the buer states of relays in the
current time slot, we consider in this work also the decoding strategy of the eaves-
dropper. Based on the knowledge of the main and eavesdropper channels, we have
two buer-aided relay selection schemes.
Case 1: if the instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper channels jhSEj2 and jhRnEj2
are available at the destination, we select the message relay as
Rcase1 = argmax
Rn
n jhSRn j21	(Qn) 6=L
jhSE j2 ;
jhRnDj21	(Qn) 6=0
jhSE j2+jhRnE j2
o
; (4.3)
where 1	(Qn) 6=L (1	(Qn)6=0) equals 1 if 	(Qn) 6= L (	(Qn) 6= 0), i.e., the relay Rn is
available for source-relay (relay-destination) transmission and equals 0 otherwise.
Case 2: if only the distributions of the eavesdropper channels are available at the
destination, we select the message relay as
Rcase2 = argmax
Rn
n jhSRn j21	(Qn) 6=L
se
;
jhRnDj21	(Qn) 6=0
se+re
o
; (4.4)
where se and re are the average channel gains of the source-eavesdropper and the
relay-eavesdropper channels, respectively.
From (4.3) and (4.4) we can see that, the new buer-aided relay selection schemes
select the message relay from all available relays, which can obtain a full diversity
gain as the available buer-aided relay selection schemes in [33]. However, for a
packet transmitted from the source to the destination via a relay R which is selected
according to the relay selection scheme in networks with RF relays, the packet will
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be decoded at the eavesdropper with a higher probability as they consider no eects
of the eavesdropper's decoding strategy in their schemes and select the message relay
only based on the CSI of the main channels [30{32, 35{37] or CSI of both the main
and eavesdropper links in the current time slot [33], which is dangerous for networks
with high-security requirement. It is notable that, our new buer-aided relay selection
schemes can address this issue and ensure a strong form of security for the wireless
communication. It is because, we select the message relay with the highest channels
gain ratio of the main and the eavesdropper channels where the channels gain of the
eavesdropper channel for the relay-destination transmission is obtained by combining
the signals received in the previous time slot and the current time slot for a tagged
packet, which can greatly improve the security of the concerned network.
4.2.2 Performance Metrics
To fully characterize the security and delay performances of the transmission,
we adopt the same end-to-end (E2E) delay and E2E secure transmission probability
(STP) denitions as in [39]. For a tagged packet from the source to the destination,
we denote R as the message relay which is selected in two hops to transmit this
packet, the E2E delay T is formulated as
T = Ts + Tr + Tq; (4.5)
where Ts (Tr) is the waiting time of the packet at the source S (R) before it is
transmitted, and Tq denotes the queuing delay which is dened as the time it takes
the packet to move from the end to the head of R's queue. The E2E STP pst is
dened as
pst = P(CSRs  "; CRDs  "); (4.6)
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where CSRs (C
RD
s ) denotes the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the S ! R (R !
D) link and CSRs  " (CRDs  ") represents the event that the S ! R (R ! D)
link is selected and secure transmission is conducted when the tagged packet is at S
(the head of R's queue).
4.3 E2E STP and Delay Analysis
To derive the E2E delay and E2E STP, we will rst provide the state transition
matrices in this subsection to depict the delivery process of a tagged packet at the
source and the selected relay, which is shown in Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, respectively.
Based on the state transition matrices in Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, the E2E STP and
E2E delay are then derived in a closed form in Theorem IV.1 and Theorem IV.2,
respectively.
Assuming that si (esk) is the buer state when the tagged packet is at the source
(head of the message relay R) and
si =

	si(Q1);	si(Q2);    ;	si(Qn);    ;	si(QN)
T
; (4.13)
esk = 	esk(Q1);    ;	esk(Q);    ;	esk(Qn);    ;	esk(QN)T ; n 2 f1;    ; Ng; n 6= ;
(4.14)
where 	(Qn) is the number of packets in Rn's buer and R denotes the message relay.
It is obvious that each state corresponds to a pair of (N1(s); N2(s)), where N1(s),
s 2 fsi; eskg denotes the number of available relays for the source-relay, N2(s) denotes
the number of available relays for the relay-destination transmission, and a relay Rn
is available for the source-relay (relay-destination) transmission when 	(Qn) 6= L
(	(Qn) 6= 0). Based on the relay selection schemes in (4.3), (4.4), a relay is selected
for the source-relay transmission or relay-destination transmission at each time slot,
and the number of packets in the relay buer will increased (decreased) by one if
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case1(s) =
N1(s)X
n1=0
Cn1N1(s)( 1)n1

(n12" + )

1  
2
re
(rd + se2")(rd + re2")
N2(s)
; (4.7)
case1(s) =
Z 1
2"

1  
2
rd
(rd + sex)(rd + rex)
N2(s)

N1(s)X
n1=0
Cn1N1(s)( 1)n1+1
(n1x+ )2
dx; (4.8)
case2(s) =

1  e 2"=N1(s) 1  e 2"(se+re)=rdN2(s) ; (4.9)
case2(s) =
N2(s)X
n2=0
N1(s) 1X
n1=0

N2(s)
n2

N1(s)  1
n1

( 1)n2+n1N1(s)rde
 n2(se+re)+rd+n1rd
rd
n2(se + re) + rd + n1rd
;
(4.10)
(s) =
N1(s)X
n1=0
N2(s)X
n2=0

N1(s)
n1

N2(s)
n2

( 1)n1+n2 rd
2"[n1(se + re) + n1rd] + rd
;
(4.11)
!(s) =
N1(s)X
n1=0
N2(s) 1X
n2=0
 
N1(s)
n1
 
N2(s) 1
n2

( 1)n1+n2N2(s)2rd
2"[n1rd + (n2  )(se + re)]2 + rd(n1rd +  + n2(se + re)) :
(4.12)
there is a secure source-relay (relay-destination) transmission. Thus, the relay buer
state may move to several possible states in the next time slot, forming a Markov
chain. However, if an outage event occurs, the relay buer state remain unchanged
in the next time slot.
Denoting A (eA) as the state transition matrix of the Markov chain and aj;i (eak;l)
as the entry of A (eA) for the source-relay (relay-destination) delivery of the tagged
packet. Thus, ai;j (eak;l) gives the transition probability that state si (esk) moves to sj
(esl) in the next time slot. From (4.3) and (4.4), we can see that the selection of a
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source-relay link and a relay-destination link at each time slot is not equal. To derive
A (eA), we divide all states that si (esk) can moves to into two sets as in [33], i.e.,
S+ ( eS+) and S  ( eS ), where S+ ( eS+) contains all states si (esk) can move to as a
secure source-relay transmission is conducted and S  ( eS ) contains all states si (esk)
can move to as a secure relay-destination transmission is conducted.
Lemma 5 Suppose that the relay buers are in state si when the tagged packet is at
the source node, the (i; j)-th entry of the state transition matrix A for the source-relay
delivery process under case 1 and case 2 is given by
ai;j =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(si); if sj = si;
(si)
N1(si)
; if sj 2 S+i ;
1  (si)  (si)
N2(si)
; if sj 2 S i ;
0; elsewhere:
(4.15)
where  2 fcase1; case2g denotes the eavesdropper CSI case, and (si) and (si)
are given in (4.7) and (4.8) for case 1, and in (4.9) and (4.10) for case 2 with the
parameter s = si.
Proof 7 See Appendix B.1 for the proof.
When the tagged packet is at the source source node, there are possible (L+ 1)N
buer states as there are N relays and each relay can store at most L packets in its
buer. Thus, the transition matrix for the source-relay transmission is a (L+ 1)N 
(L + 1)N matrix. As in [18], the transition matrix A is irreducible and aperiodic.
Denoting  = [s1 ;    ; si ;    ; s(L+1)N ]T as the stationary state probability vector
of the Markov chain, we have A =  and
(L+1)NP
i=1
si = 1, where 

si
denotes the
stationary probability of state si, and from [18], we can get
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 = (A  I+B) 1b; (4.16)
where b = (1;    ; 1)T , I is the identity matrix and B is an all-one matrix.
Lemma 6 Suppose that the relay buers are in state sk when the tagged packet is at
end of the message relay R, the (k; l)-th entry of the state transition matrix eA for
the relay-destination delivery process under case 1 and case 2 is given by
eak;l =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(esk); if esl = esk;
(esk)
N1(esk) ; if esl 2 eS+k ;
1  (esk)  (esk)
N2(esk)  1 ; if esl 2 eS k ;
0; elsewhere:
(4.17)
where  2 fcase1; case2g denotes the eavesdropper CSI case, (esk) and (esk) are
given in (4.7) and (4.8) for case 1 and in (4.9) and (4.10) for case 2.
Proof 8 The proof is same as that for Lemma 5, so we have omitted it here.
When the tagged packet is at the head of the selected relay R, the buer of R
cannot be empty and there are only L  (L + 1)N 1 possible buer states in total.
Thus, the transition matrix eA is a L(L + 1)N 1  L(L + 1)N 1 matrix and the
stationary probability vector of the Markov chain for the relay-destination delivery
process e = (es1 ;    ; esk ;    ; esL(L+1)N 1 )T can be determined as
e = (eA eI+ eB) 1eb; (4.18)
where eb = (1;    ; 1)T , eI is the identity matrix and eB is an all-one matrix.
Combing the results in Lemma 5, Lemma 6 and the denitions of E2E STP in
(4.6) and the E2E delay in (4.5), the E2E STP and the E2E delay of the system
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concerned in this work can be derived as follows.
Theorem IV.1 Consider the two-hop wireless system in Figure 4.1 and under our
the buer-aided relay selection scheme in Section 4.2, the E2E STP for case 1 can be
determined as
pcase1st =
(L+1)NX
i=1
case1si case1(si)
L(L+1)N 1X
k=1
case1esk 1  case1(esk)  case1(esk)N2(esk) ;
(4.19)
where si (esk) denotes the buer state when the tagged packet is at S (the head of a
given relay queue), case1si and 
case1esk are given by (4.16) and (4.18) with  = case1,
case1(esk) is given by (4.7) with s = esk, case1(si) and case1(esk) are given by (4.8) with
s = si and s = esk respectively. The E2E STP for case 2 is given by
pcase2st =
(L+1)NX
i=1
case2si  (1  (si)  !(si))
L(L+1)N 1X
k=1
case2esk !(esk)N2(esk) ; (4.20)
where case2si and 
case2esk are given by (4.16) and (4.18) with  = case2, (si) is given
by (4.11) with s = si, !(si) and !(esk) are given by (4.12) with s = si and s = esk
respectively.
Proof 9 The proof is the same as that for the Theorem III.1 in Chapter III with si
and esk being replaced by (4.16) and (4.18), (si) being replaced by (4.11), and !(si)
and !(esk) being replaced by (4.12), respectively.
Now we are ready to give the following theorem regarding the expected E2E delay
of the system.
Theorem IV.2 Consider the two-hop relay wireless system as illustrated in Figure
4.1. Under the buer-aided relay selection scheme in Section 4.2, the E2E delay of
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the system for both case 1 and case 2 can be determined as
T =
1 + 1
N
(L+1)NP
i=1
NP
n=1
si	si(Qn)
(L+1)NP
i=1
si(si)
+
1
L(L+1)N 1P
k=1
esk (1 (esk) (esk))N2(esk)
; (4.21)
where  2 fcase1; case2g, si is given by (4.16), (si) is given in Lemma 5, esk is
given by (4.18), (esk) and (esk)) are given in Lemma 6.
Proof 10 The proof is the same as that that for the Theorem III.2 in Chapter III
with si and 
esk being replaced by (4.16) and (4.18), (si) being replaced by (si)
in Lemma 5, and (esk) and (esk) being replaced by (esk) and (esk) in Lemma
6, respectively.
4.4 Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we rst provide simulation results to verify the theoretical models
for the E2E STP and expected E2E delay, then proceed to study the security-delay
trade-o in our concerned network, and nally comparisons will be made between our
proposed schemes and the Max-Ratio relay selection scheme to explore the eects of
eavesdropper's decoding strategy on the E2E STP and delay performances.
4.4.1 Simulation Settings
A dedicated C++ simulator was developed to simulate the E2E delivery process
of the packet based on our proposed buer-aided relay selection schemes in (4.3) and
(4.4) respectively, where the transmission power of each node is set as P = 15 and
the noise variance 2 = 1. In all simulations, the total time slots is xed as 105,
and the buer-aided relay selection scheme is performed once per time slot for both
case 1 and case 2. The average channel gains of the main and eavesdropper links sr
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and rd are set as sr = rd = 5 dB. Thus, the corresponding SNR is high enough to
guarantee the successful decoding of each packet at the relays and destination. The
average channel gains of the eavesdropper channels se and re are set as
sr

and rd

respectively, where  and  are the channel gain ratios of the main and eavesdropper
links. The simulated E2E STP is calculated as
pst =
Ns
Nt
; (4.22)
where Ns is the number of packets securely transmitted to the destination D and Nt
denotes the number of totally transmitted packet from the source S. The simulated
expected E2E delay is calculated as
T =
Tt
Ns
; (4.23)
where Tt is the total E2E delay (measured in time slots) of all packets reached at D.
4.4.2 Model Validation
Extensive numerical results have been conducted to verify the theoretical results
of the E2E STP and expected E2E delay. For the network scenario of N = L = 5, we
rst conduct simulation results of E2E STP and expected E2E delay under various
settings of the target secrecy rate ". The corresponding simulated and theoretical
results of E2E STP pst ( 2 fcase1; case2g) are shown in Figure 4.2a, and the
results of expected E2E delay T are depicted in Figure 4.2b, for both case 1 and
case 2 respectively. We can see from Figure 4.2 that the simulation results match
nicely with the theoretical ones for both cases, which indicates that our theoretical
framework is highly ecient in depicting the E2E delivery process of the packet in
the concerned network.
Then, with the network settings of L = 5,  =  = 5 and " = 2, we provide plots
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Figure 4.2: Simulation results vs. theoretical results for E2E STP and expected E2E
delay with dierent target secrecy rate ".
of the theoretical and simulated results of the pst and T under various value of the
number of relays N in Figure 4.3, and for network settings of N = 5,  =  = 2
and " = 2 under various value of the relay buer size L in Figure 4.4. It can be
observed from Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 that all the simulations results can match
the theoretical results very nicely, indicating that our theoretical framework is highly
ecient for the pst and T modeling.
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Figure 4.3: Simulation results vs. theoretical results for E2E STP and expected E2E
delay with dierent number of relays N .
4.4.3 Performance Discussion
Based on our theoretical results, we now study the eects of the network param-
eters (e.g., ", N and L) on the security and delay performances (pst and T) of the
concerned system. Regarding the eects of target secrecy rate ", we can see from
Figure 4.2 that the pst decreases as the target secrecy rate " increases and the T in-
creases as " increases in both case 1 and case 2. This is because that, the buer-aided
relay selection scheme (See Section 4.2) allows a packet to be transmitted only if the
instantaneous secrecy capacity of the selected link is higher than ". So, as " increases,
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Figure 4.4: Simulation results vs. theoretical results for E2E STP and expected E2E
delay with dierent buer size L.
the probability of securely transmitting a packet will decrease for each transmission,
which will result in a lower pst. Moreover, as the packet has to be stored in the relay
buer to wait for the next transmission if the current link is not secure, which will
cause a larger queuing delay of the packet and thus a higher T.
For the eects of the number of relays N on the pst and T, we can see from Fig
4.3a that the pst increases as N increases for both case 1 and case 2, and from 4.3b
that T also increases as the number of relays N increases. This is because that more
relays will introduce more available links for the transmission and thus a higher pst.
On the other hand, however, more relays will result in a higher queuing delay and
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mean service time in the second hop. Thus, T increases as the number of relays N
increases.
Finally, for the eects of the number of relays N on the pst and T, we can observe
from Figure 4.4 that pst and T increase as L increases for both case 1 and case 2,
which is due to the similar reason of introducing more relays in the system. We can
also see from Figure 4.4a that pst tends to be a constant as the relay buer size L
increases above a certain value. This occurs due to the relay that almost all links
are available for either the source-relay or relay-destination transmissions as the relay
buer size increases above a certain value, thus the link quality of the selected link
at each time slot can hardly to be improved, which will cause a constant E2E STP.
4.4.4 Security-Delay Trade-O Analysis
Based on the theoretical results of pst and T, we now investigate the trade-o
between the E2E STP and the expected E2E delay with the new buer-aided relay
selection scheme in Section 4.2.
Set  =  = 5; " = 2, we illustrate in Figure 4.5a for L = 5 and in Figure 4.5b
for N = 5 the maximum achievable E2E STP vs. the expected E2E delay constraint
 , respectively. From curves in Figure 4.5a and Figure 4.5b we can see that, the
achievable E2E STP increases when  increases in both case 1 and case 2. This
indicates that, as the E2E delay constraint of the network is relaxed, i.e., a higher
delay can be tolerated, a higher maximum E2E STP performance can be achieved.
This clearly shows the trade-o between the E2E security and delay performances of
the system. Moreover, according to results Figure 4.5a (Figure 4.5b), we can select
an optimal N (L) for the corresponding maximum E2E STP for each given delay
constraint  of the network.
Then, we can carefully observe from Figure 4.5 that, as the delay constraint 
scales up, the maximum E2E STP in Figure 4.5b has dierent trend as that in Figure
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Figure 4.5: Maximum achievable E2E STP vs. expected E2E delay constraint  .
4.5a. For example, in case 1, as  varies from 0 to 100, the maximum E2E STP
in Figure 4.5a changes from 0.63 to 0.79, while the maximum E2E STP in Fig 4.5b
increases from 0.76 to 0.77. In case 2, as  increases from 100 to 200, the maximum
E2E STP in Figure 4.5a varies from 0.766 to 0.779, while the maximum E2E STP
in Fig 4.5b increases from 0.75 to 0.8. Thus, we can conclude that, the maximum
achievable E2E STP respect to N are more sensitive to the delay constraint  .
Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b show the corresponding achievable expected E2E
delay under a given E2E STP constraint  for xed L = 5 and xed N = 5 in both
case 1 and case 2, respectively. It can be seen from Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b that
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Figure 4.6: Minimum achievable expected E2E delay vs. E2E STP constraint .
the minimum achievable expected E2E delay increases as the E2E STP constraint 
increases. Notice that a higher  means a higher security requirement of the system.
Thus, the results in Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b indicate that, to improve the security
performance of the system, extra delay will be introduced in the system, which also
shows the trade-o between the E2E security and delay performances of the concerned
system.
We can also see from Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b that, as the E2E STP constraint
 increases above a certain value, the minimum expected E2E delay becomes indeter-
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minable. This is because that, for given ,  and the target secrecy rate ", the E2E
STP will nally converges to the corresponding threshold as N (resp. L ) increase
(See results in Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b). Thus, as  increases above a certain
value, we cannot determine the corresponding L and N and the minimum expected
E2E delay thus cannot be determined.
A further observation from Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b shows that, as  increases,
the trend of minimum expected E2E delay respect to N and L are dierent. For
example, as  increases from 0.72 to 0.8 in case 1, the minimum E2E delay increases
from 50 to 65 in Figure 4.6b while the minimum E2E delay increases from 3 to 56
in Figure 4.6a. In case 2, as  increases from 0.72 to 0.8, the minimum E2E delay
in Figure 4.6b increases from 70 to 100, but the minimum E2E delay in Figure 4.6a
increases from 3 to 90. Thus, compared with the minimum achievable expected E2E
delay respect to N , the minimum achievable expected E2E delay respect to L depends
more heavily on .
4.4.5 Eects of Eavesdropper's Decoding Strategy on E2E STP and E2E
Delay
Based on our theoretical results, we explore in this section the eects of eavesdrop-
per's decoding strategy on the E2E STP and the expected E2E delay performances
of dierent buer-aided relay selection schemes.
In Figure 4.7, we plot the E2E STP of the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay selection
scheme and our proposed scheme for network settings of N = L = 5;  =  = 5 in
both case 1 (resp. Figure 4.7a) and case 2 (resp. Figure 4.7b) by varying the target
secrecy rate ". We can see from the Figure 4.7 that E2E STP of our new proposed
buer-aided relay selection scheme is always higher than that of the conventional
Max-Ratio buer-aided relay section scheme, showing that our proposed new relay
selection scheme outperforms the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay selection scheme in
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Figure 4.7: E2E STP vs. target secrecy rate " with dierent relay selection schemes.
terms of the E2E STP for both case 1 and case 2. This indicates that, by considering
the decoding strategy of the eavesdropper in the design of the buer-aided relay
selection scheme, the security performance of the network can be largely improved.
In. Figure 4.8, we show the expected E2E delay of the Max-Ratio buer-aided
relay selection scheme and our proposed scheme for network settings of N = L =
5;  =  = 5 in both case 1 (resp. Figure 4.8a) and case 2 (resp. Figure 4.8b) by
varying the target secrecy rate ". We can observe from Figure 4.8 that, the expected
E2E delay of our scheme is higher than that of the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay
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Figure 4.8: Expected E2E delay vs. target secrecy rate " with dierent relay selection
schemes.
selection scheme. This is because, in our buer-aided relay selection scheme, the
packet has to wait longer in the relay buer for a strong link, which will result in a
larger queuing delay of the packet and thus a higher expected E2E delay.
4.5 Summary
This chapter investigates the buer-aided relay selection scheme design for two-
hop wireless networks with DF relays. Unlike the available buer-aided relay selection
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schemes, the proposed buer-aided relay selection scheme can defence the combining
decoding by the eavesdropper. The E2E STP and expected E2E delay are derived
in a closed for to validate the eciency of the proposed scheme. The security-delay
trade-o issue is addressed to explore the maximum achievable E2E STP (minimum
achievable expected E2E delay) under a given expected E2E delay constraint (E2E
STP constraint). Moreover, the eects of the eavesdropper's decoding strategy on the
security and delay performances are examined. Results show that our proposed buer-
aided relay selection scheme outperforms the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay selection
scheme in terms of the E2E STP. Since the packet in this work has to wait for a
longer time in the relay buer, which will result in a larger E2E delay. Thus, we will
consider in our future work a delay-reduced buer-aided relay selection scheme design
for secure two-hop wireless networks.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusions
This nal chapter summarize our contributions and points out several topics for
future research.
5.0.1 Summary of the Thesis
In this thesis, we studied the PHY security performances of two-hop wireless
networks, where the PHY security technique of buer-aided relay selection is adopted
to ensure security of the communication. We rst explored the E2E PHY security
performance of buer-aided relay selection scheme for two-hop wireless networks with
RF relays, and then investigated the E2E PHY security performance of buer-aided
relay selection scheme for two-hop wireless networks with DF relays.
For the PHY security performance of buer-aided relay selection scheme for two-
hop wireless networks with RF relays, we studied in Chapter III the E2E STP and
expected E2E delay of a two-hop wireless network with one source-destination pair,
multiple relays each having a nite buer and an eavesdropper who can only inde-
pendently decode its received packets. A general framework is rst developed to
characterize the E2E delivery process of a tagged packet for the Max-Ratio buer-
aided relay selection scheme. Based on the theoretical framework, we then determined
the E2E STP and the expected E2E delay of the scheme. The main results in Chapter
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III showed that there is a clear trade-o between the E2E security performance and
delay performance in the concerned system. For example, if we impose a larger upper
bound (i.e., a less strict constraint) on the expected E2E delay, the maximum E2E
STP (in terms of either relay buer size or number of relays) tends to increase, and
such trend is more sensitive to the variation of the number of relays than that of the
relay buer size. On the other hand, if we impose a smaller lower bound (i.e., a more
strict constraint) on the E2E STP, the minimum expected E2E delay (in terms of
either relay buer size or number of relays) tends to decrease, and this trend is more
sensitive to the variation of the relay buer size than that of the number of relays.
This work is very important and can be future explored as guidelines for the design
of future networks.
For the PHY security performance of buer-aided relay selection scheme with two-
hop wireless networks with DF relays, we investigated in Chapter IV the E2E STP
and expected E2E delay of a two-hop wireless network with one source-destination
pair, multiple relays and an eavesdropper who can combine the signals received in
two hops to conduct its decoding. We consider two eavesdropper CSI cases, i.e., the
case 1 where the instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper channels are available, and
the case 2 where only distributions of the eavesdropper channels are available. Two
buer-aided relay selection schemes were proposed to resist the combining decoding of
the packets by the eavesdropper such that the security performance of the concerned
network can be improved. Expressions of the E2E STP and expected E2E delay were
derived in a closed form to validate the eciency of the proposed buer-aided relay s-
election schemes. The security-delay trade-o was explored and the comparisons were
made between our proposed buer-aided relay selection scheme and the conventional
Max-Ratio buer-aided relay selection scheme to explore the eects of eavesdropper's
decoding strategy on the network performances. The results in Section IV indicated
that our new scheme outperforms the Max-Ratio buer-aided relay selection scheme
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in terms of the E2E STP. With this work, we can provide theoretical models for the
two-hop wireless networks with DF relays, which can be applied for the performance
study of general multi-hop networks.
5.0.2 Future Works
The work presented in this thesis can be extended in many interesting directions.
 Packet delay-reduced buer-aided relay selection scheme design for
two-hop wireless networks. In this thesis, we mainly focus on buer-aided
relay selection schemes to enhance the security of wireless networks which is also
the main goals of available work. However, the packet in the relay buer may
have to wait for a very long time for a good link. Since then the introduction of
buers at the relays will naturally make a large packet delay for the concerned
network, especially for delay-sensitive networks. So a meaningful and interesting
work is to study the packet delay-reduced buer-aided relay selection scheme
for secure wireless networks to explore or impose constraint on the maximum
delay that can be tolerated. For example, if the delay is near the maximum
allowable value, the relay may be forced to transmit the packet regardless of
the link quality. Another idea is that we can design the relay selection scheme
based on the states of the relay buers, and give priority to relays whose buer
is nearly full or empty.
 Secrecy capacity analysis for buer-aided relay wireless networks. Due
to the buer-aided relay selection schemes adopted in this thesis, the secrecy
capacity formulation of an individual link is enough for us to derive the main
results in this thesis, i.e., the E2E secure transmission probability and the ex-
pected E2E delay. This is because that, based on the buer-aided relay selection
schemes adopted in this thesis, in each time slot we select a best relay for trans-
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mission from all relays only based on the instantaneous secrecy capacity of each
link and states of all relay buers. Thus, the above secrecy capacity formu-
lation of an individual link is enough for us to derive the main results in this
thesis. But the secrecy capacity formulation of the overall buer-aided relay
networks is still an open problem. This is because that in such system, 1) each
packet now may go through three processes, i.e., the source-relay transmission
process, queuing process in a relay buer and the relay-destination transmission
process; 2) in each time slot, there are three possible transmission states, i.e.,
source-relay transmission, relay-destination transmission and no transmission.
These two basic properties make the time T 0 it takes to transmit a packet from
the source to the destination highly uncertain (T 0 can vary from 2 to innite),
and the possible number of transmission states during these T time slots is in
the order of O(3T
0
). These two main issues make the secrecy capacity formu-
lation and analysis of the buer-aided relay system highly challenging (if not
impossible). Therefore, a new and dedicated study is deserved on the secrecy
capacity formulation of the general buer-aided relay systems, and the study of
this topic is of great importance for the secrecy capacity of buer-aided relay
wireless networks.
 f-cast buer-aided relaying scheme in wireless networks. Available
buer-aided relay selection schemes for secure two-hop wireless networks al-
ways select only one relay for the data transmission, making most of the relay
nodes non-transmitting during each transmission. This is a waste of the net-
work resource. Moreover, the data may have to wait for a long time to be
securely transmitted to the destination if the link from/to the message relay is
not secure, which will cause a larger delay of the data. While selecting multi-
ple message relays before each transmission can not only improve the security
performance of the network, but also can reduce the network delay. This is due
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to two reasons: 1) Any secure transmission of the selected multiple message
relays means a secure and successful transmission of the network, i.e., a higher
secure transmission probability of the network; 2) The more message relays,
the higher probability to securely transmit the data, and thus a lower waiting
time of the data, which will lead to a lower delay performance of the network.
Therefore, the study of buer-aided relay selection with multiple message re-
lays is an interesting and meaningful future direction for performances of secure
two-hop wireless networks. Actually, we can select the top n "best" relay as the
message relays based on the link quality and the states of relay buers to help
the transmission of a tagged packet.
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APPENDIX A
Proofs in Chapter III
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We rst provide proof for the perfect eavesdropper CSI case. LetX =
max
Rn:	si (Qn)6=L
fjhSRn j2g
jhSE j2
and Y = max
Rn:	si (Qn)6=0
f jhRnDj2jhRnE j2 g. From [33], we know that the cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) of X and Y are
FX(x) =
N1(si)X
n1=0

N1(si)
n1

( 1)n1 
n1x+ 
; (A.1)
and
FY (y) =

y
 + y
N2(si)
; (A.2)
respectively, where  = sr
se
,  = rd
re
. According to the relay selection scheme in
(3.4) and (3.5), transmission at each time slot occurs on the link with instantaneous
channel gain maxfX;Y g. According to the transmission scheme in Section 3.2.2, the
probability of no state transition (i.e., sj = si) equals the probability of Rs < ". Thus,
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ai;i can be given by
ai;i = P (log(maxfX; Y g) < ") (A.3)
= P(maxfX;Y g < 2") (A.4)
= FX(2
")  FY (2") (A.5)
= PF(si); (A.6)
where PF(si) is given in (3.9) with s = si and the last step follows after substituting
(A.1) and (A.2) into (A.3). Next, the probability that si moves to S i can be given
by
P(S i jsi) = P (maxfX; Y g  2"; X < Y ) (A.7)
=
Z 2"
0
P(Y  2")fX(x)dx+
Z 1
2"
P(Y > x)fX(x)dx (A.8)
= 1  PF  
Z 1
2"
FY (x)fX(x)dx (A.9)
= 1  PF(si)  PF(si); (A.10)
where PF(s) is given in (3.10) with s = si. Due to the i.i.d. property of channels, the
selection of one particular link within all available relay-destination links is equally
likely. Thus, for any state sn 2 S i , ai;j = 1 PF(si) PF(si)N2(si) . Notice that the buer
state can only move from si to si itself, the states in S i or S+i . Hence, for any state
sj 2 S+i , ai;j = PF(si)N1(si) .
Next, we provide proof for the partial eavesdropper CSI case. We rst dene new
random variables X
0
=
max
Rn:	si (Qn) 6=L
fjhSRn j2g
se
and Y
0
=
max
Rn:	si (Qn) 6=0
fjhRnDj2g
re
with CDF
given by FX0 (x) = (1 e 
x
 )N1(si) and FY 0 (y) = (1 e 
y
 )N2(si) , respectively. Following
the proof for the perfect eavesdropper CSI case, we can calculate the state transition
probabilities ai;j for sj = si, sj 2 S i and sj 2 S+i as PT(si), 1 PT(si) PT(si)N2(si) 1 and
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PT(si)
N1(si)
respectively, where
PT(si) = FX0 (2
")  FY 0 (2"); (A.11)
is given by (3.11) after substituting FX0 (2
") and FY 0 (2
") in and
PT(si) =
Z 1
2"
FY 0 (x)fX0 (x)dx (A.12)
is given by (3.12) after calculating the above integral.
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APPENDIX B
Proofs in Chapter IV
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5
We rst provide proof for the case 1. Assuming that X = arg max
Rn:	si (Qn)6=L
jhSRn j2
jhSE j2 ,
Y = arg max
Rn:	si (Qn)6=0
jhRnDj2
jhSE j2+jhRnE j2 . From [33], we know that the cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF) of X is
FX(x) =
N1(si)X
n1=0

N1(si)
n1

( 1)n1 
n1x+ 
; (B.1)
where  = sr
se
. Then, let Y1 = jhRnDj2,Y2 = jhSEj2 + jhRnEj2, the CDF of Y1Y2 can be
determined as
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FY1
Y2
(y) = P(Y1  Y2y)
=
Z 1
0
Fy1(y2y)fY2(y2)dy2
=
Z 1
0

1  e 
y2y
rd

 1
se   re

e 
y1
se + e 
y1
re

dy2
=
1
se   re
Z 1
0

1  e 
y1y
rd



e 
y1
se + e 
y1
re

dy2
= 1  
2
rd
(rd + sey)(rd + rey)
; (B.2)
where
FY1(y1) = 1  e 
y1
rd ; (B.3)
and
FY2(y2) =
1
se   re

e 
y2
se + e 
y2
re

: (B.4)
Thus, based on the probability theory, the CDF of Y is
FY (y) =

1  
2
rd
(rd + sex)(rd + rex)
N2
: (B.5)
According to the buer-aided relay selection scheme in (4.3) and (4.4), a message
relay is selected at each time slot with instantaneous channel gain ratio maxfX;Y g,
and the state si remains unchanged as Cs < ". Thus, the entry ai;i of the transition
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matrix A can be given by
ai;i = P (log(maxfX;Y g) < ") (B.6)
= P(maxfX; Y g < 2") (B.7)
= FX(2
")  FY (2") (B.8)
= case1(si); (B.9)
where case1(si) is given in (4.7) with s = si and the last step follows after substituting
(B.1) and (B.5) into (B.6). The probability that state si moves to state sj (sj 2 S )
can be given as
pi;j = P(X  Y; Y  2")
=
Z 1
0
P(x  Y; Y  2")fX(x)dx
=
Z 2"
0
P(Y  2")fX(x)dx+
Z 1
2"
P(Y  x)fX(x)dx
= P(Y  2")P(X  2") +
Z 1
2"
fX(x)dx 
Z 1
2"
FY (x)fX(x)dx
= 1  FX(2")FY (2") 
Z 1
2"
FY (x)fX(x)dx
= 1  case1(si)  case1(si); (B.10)
where case1(s) is given in (4.8) with s = si. Since the selection of a particular relay
from all available relays is equally likely due to the i.i.d. property of main channels,
for any state sj 2 S i , ai;j = 1 case1(si) case1(si)N2(si) . Notice that a state si can only move
to three types of states, the si itself, the states in S i and states in S+i . Hence, for
any state sj 2 S+i , ai;j = case1(si)N1(si) .
Next, we provide proof for case 2. Let X 0 = arg max
Rn:	si (Qn) 6=L
jhSRn j2
se
,
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Y 0 = arg max
Rn:	si (Qn)6=0
jhRnDj2
se+re
with the CDFs of X 0 and Y 0 given by
FX0(x) = (1  e  x )N1(si); (B.11)
and
FY 0(x) = (1  e 
(se+re)x
rd )N2(si); (B.12)
respectively. Following the proof for case 1, we can obtain ai;j for si = sj, sj 2 S+i
and sj 2 S i as case2(si), case2(si)N1(si) and
1 case2(si) case2(si)
N2(si) 1 and respectively, where
case2(s) = FX0(2
")  FY 0(2"); (B.13)
is given in (4.9) by substituting FX0(2
") and FY 0(2
") into (B.13) and
case2(s) =
Z 1
2"
FY 0 (x)fX0 (x)dx; (B.14)
is given in (4.10).
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